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Abstract
This Note will analyze Lome III’s private investment protection and promotion provisions to
determine whether the provisions would actually promote the flow of capital needed by the ACP
States to meet their development goals, or whether these provisions merely perpetuate the elements
of the historical colonial relationship that persisted under the prior Lome Conventions. Part I of
this Note will detail the historical relationship between the ACP States and the EEC countries,
emphasizing the prior Lome Conventions. Part II will give the background of Lome III, and will
review the Convention’s private investment provisions. Part III will analyze the effect of article
243, regarding investment protection agreements, and article 244, concerning investment insurance
and guarantees, on the flow of private investment to ACP States. The Note will conclude that the
private investment provisions are indeed a step toward promoting the economic development of the
ACP States, if two conditions are met. First, the EEC and ACP must fulfill the promises that they
have made to study the problems that discourage private investment and take substantive action
based upon these studies. Second, the rules of origin and the safeguard cluase of the Lome III
Convention must be modified.

PROMISES, PROMISES: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF
LOME III's PRIVATE INVESTMENT
PROVISIONS
1976:

"In the history books [Lomb I] will go down as a
symbol of a revolution which gave the Third World
access to .

1984:

.

. [shared responsibility] and to in-

creased prosperity."'
"The Lom6 Convention does not provide answers
to all questions and it cannot invent solutions to
every problem ....

[I]t is a genuine attempt to

tackle some of the most serious problems confronting developing countries today." 2
INTRODUCTION
On December 8, 1984, the European Economic Community' (EEC or Community) and the African, Caribbean, and Pal. Address by Georges Spenale, President of the ACP-EEC Consultative Assembly, before the First Meeting of the Consultative Assembly of the Lom6 Convention
(EEC-ACP),June 1-3, 1976 European ParliamentInformation Series 10 (spec. ed. 1976).
2. Address by Peter Barry, President of the European Council of Ministers, at
the signing of Lom6 III, A new dimension in ACP-EEC cooperation, COURIER, Jan.-Feb.
1985, at 7, 8.
3. The European Economic Community (EEC or Community) is one of three
legally definable, treaty-based Communities in Western Europe. See D. LASOK &J.W.
BRIDGE,

AN

INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW AND INSTITUTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMU-

15-25 (1982). The other two Communities are the European Coal and Steel
Community [hereinafter cited as ECSC] and the European Atomic Energy Community [hereinafter cited as Euratom]. B. HAWK, 1 UNITED STATES, COMMON MARKET
AND INTERNATIONAL ANTI-TRUST:
A COMPARATIVE GUIDE 411 (2d ed. 1986). The
ECSC was created in 1951. Treaty Instituting the European Coal and Steel Community, April 18, 1951, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. (Cmd. 5189), 261 U.N.T.S. 140. The
EEC and Euratom were created by treaties signed by France, the Federal Republic of
Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg at Rome in 1957. Treaty
establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S.
No. 1 (Cmd. 5179-II) (official English translation), 298 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter cited
as the Treaty of Rome]; Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1 (Cmd. 5179-I1), 298 U.N.T.S. 167.
The EEC has four institutions: the Commission, the Council, the European Parliament (formerly called the Assembly) and the Court of Justice of the European
Communities. Treaty of Rome, supra art. 4; K. BORCHARDT, THE ABC OF COMMUNITY
LAW 16 (1983). The Commission has broad executive powers. Treaty of Rome, supra
art. 155. The Council is the supreme legislative body of the Community. Id. art. 145.
The European Parliament has limited powers of supervision over the Commission.
K. BORCHARDT, supra at 19. The Court of Justice administers the law of the ECSC,
Euratom, and the EEC. Convention Relating to Certain Institutions Common to the
European Communities, Mar. 25, 1957, S II, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1 (Cmd. 5179NITIES
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cific States4 (ACP or ACP States) signed the third Lom6 ConII); see Sweet & Maxwell's European Community Treaties 231 (K.R. Simmonds 4th ed.
1980). See generally Rooks, The Principal Institutions of the European Common Market, 4
A.B.A. SECT. OF INT'L & COMP. L. BULL. 8 (1959); Whitlow, The European Economic
Community: Some Aspects ofJuridicalPersonality, Sovereignty and InternationalObligation, 13
Bus. LAW. 813 (1957-58).
4. The African, Caribbean, and Pacific States (ACP or ACP States) came together to achieve a stronger negotiating position during the talks that led to the conclusion of the first Lom6 Convention in 1975. ACP-EEC Convention of Lomb, Feb.
28, 1975, 19 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 25) 2 (1976), 14 I.L.M. 604 (1975) [hereinafter
referred to as Lom6 I]. After signing this Convention, the ACP States decided to
institutionalize their group by signing the Georgetown Agreement. The Georgetown
Agreement, June 6, 1975, art. 2, reprinted in COURIER, Sept.-Oct. 1985, at 54-55. Article Two of the Agreement lists the ACP group's objectives:
(a) to ensure the realisation of the objectives of the Convention of Lomb,
(b) to coordinate the activities of the ACP States in the application of the
Lom6 Convention,
(c) to determine joint positions of the ACP Group vis-a-vis the EEC on matters covered by the Convention of Lom6,
(d) to promote and strengthen the existing solidarity of the ACP Group,
(e) to contribute to the development of greater and closer trade, economic
and cultural relations amongst the ACP States and amongst developing
countries in general, and to this end to develop the exchange of information amongst the ACP States in the fields of trade, technology, industry and human resources,
(f) to contribute to the promotion of effective regional and inter-regional
co-operation amongst the ACP States and amongst developing countries
in general, and to strengthen the links between the respective regional
organisations to which they belong,
(g) to promote the establishment of a new world economic order.
Id.
The ACP organs are the Council of Ministers and the Committee of Ambassadors, which are assisted by the ACP General Secretariat. Id. art. 3. The Council of
Ministers, the supreme organ, consists of a member of the government or a representive designed by each ACP State. Id. art. 4. The Council draws the plans for the work
necessary to the ACP Group's objectives. Id. art. 5. The Committee of Ambassadors
is another ACP organ. It assists the Council of Ministers in performing its duties and
ensures the implementation of the Lom6 Convention. Id. art. 13. The ACP General
Secretariat assists the ACP organs by carrying out the tasks they assign. Id. art. 19.
Since 1975, ACP membership has grown from 46 to 66 states. Dodoo, Structure
and Functioning of the ACP Group, COURIER, Sept.-Oct. 1985, at 57-61. The following
countries are currently members of the ACP group:
Angola, Antigua & Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Botswana,
Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic,
Chad, Comoros, Congo, Djibouti, Dominica, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia,
Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Guyana,
Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Kenya, Kiribati, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi,
Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Papua New
Guinea, Rwanda, St. Christopher & Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent & Grenadines, Sao Tome & Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Solomon
Islands, Somalia, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Tonga.
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vention (Lome' III) in Lome, the capital of Togo.5 This Convention is the latest in a series of conventions that have
established a partnership between the EEC and the ACP
through programs that establish price supports for particular
ACP exports and financing for ACP development projects.6
The EEC and the ACP intend that their partnership under the
Conventions serve as a model for relations between developing and developed countries. 7
A number of commentators have criticized the nature of
the relationship that has developed between the ACP States
Trinidad & Tobago, Tuvalu, Uganda, Western Samoa, Vanuatu, Zaire,
Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
See COURIER, Sept.-Oct. 1985, at i.
5. ACP-EEC Convention of Lom6 (III), Dec. 8, 1984, ACP-EEC COUNCIL OF
.MINISTERS, THE THIRD ACP-EEC CONVENTION SIGNED AT LOMt ON 8 DECEMBER AND

RELATED DOCUMENTS 11 (1985), 24 I.L.M. 588 (1985) [hereinafter referred to as
Lom6 III]. The parties reached agreement on a second Lom6 Convention shortly
before Lom6 I's expiration. Second ACP-EEC Convention of Lomb, 5 COLLECTION
OF THE AGREEMENTS CONCLUDED BY THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (Part II) 17 (1981),
23 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. L 347) 2 (1980), 19 I.L.M. 327 (1980) [hereinafter referred
to as Lom6 II].
The Lom6 III Convention must be ratified by at least two-thirds of the ACP
countries in conformity with their respective constitutional requirements. Lom6 III,
supra arts. 285-86. The Convention entered into force on May 1, 1986. Telephone
interview with Elizabeth Grant, of the Delegation of the Commission of the European
Communities to the United Nations (June 2, 1986).
6. Stabex is a commodity price stabilization plan established under the Lom6
Conventions to maintain the revenues of commodity exporting ACP States. See infra
notes 144-50 and accompanying text (discussion of the Stabex program). Sysmin
operates by providing revenue to mineral exporters when their earnings fall due to
market disruptions. See infra notes 187-88 and accompanying text (discussion of Sysmin program). Under Lom6 III, the Community's assistance shall total 8,500 million
European Currency Units [hereinafter referred to as ECU]. One ECU equals approximately U.S.$.75; therefore, the Community pledged about U.S.$6.4 billion in financial aid. European Communities Press Release, December 6, 1984 (available in the
Library of the Delegation of the Commission of the European Communities to the
United Nations). Seven million four hundred thousand ECU will come from the European Development Fund [hereinafter referred to as EDF] and 100 million ECU will
come from the European Investment Bank [hereinafter referred to as EIB] in the
form of loans. Lom6 III, supra note 5, arts. 194-96. This works out to U.S.$4 per
year for each ACP citizen, when inflation and the addition of new ACP States are
taken into account. EEC: Lome Convention-A little more aid--with knobs on, ECONOMIST,
Jan. 5-11, 1985, at 39.
7. The idea that the Conventions serve as models for relations between developing and developed countries is expressed in the all three Lom6 Conventions. See
Lom6 I, supra note 4, preamble; Lom6 II, supra note 5, preamble; Lom6 III, supra note
5, art. 3.
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and the EEC under the Lom6 Conventions.8 These critics have
said that the parties' trade exchange is a continuation of the
European countries' exploitation of their former colonies, because Lome perpetuates interdependence' in at least two
ways.' O First, because the EEC needs the ACP's raw materials,"t it fosters good trade relations with the ACP by means of
compensatory financing to minimize fluctuations in export
earnings, 1 2 trade preferences,' 3 and development aid.' 4 Sec-

ond, because the ACP lacks an advanced manufacturing sector,
it serves as a market for EEC goods made from ACP raw
8. See, e.g., Vaitsos, From the Ugly American to the Ugly European: The Role of Western
Europe in North-South Relations, in THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY 167, 187 (H.

Makler, A. Martinelli, & N. Smelser ed. 1982); Martin, Africa and the Ideology of
Eurafrica: Neo-Colonialism or Pan-Africanism?, 20 J. MOD. AFRICAN STUD. 221, 223-24
(1982); Rajana, The Lom6 Convention: An Evaluation of EECEconomic Assistance to the ACP
States, 20 J. MOD. AFRICAN STUD. 179, 219 (1982); Shaw, EEC-ACP Interactions and
Images as Redefinitions of Eurafrica: Exemplary, Exclusive and/orExploitive?, 18 J. COMMON
MKT. STUD. 135, 151 (1979).
9. See, e.g., F. CARDOSO & E. FALETrO, DEPENDENCY AND DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN
AMERICA Vii, XiV (M. Urquidi trans. 1979) (classical statement of the dependency the-

ory). In the late 1950s and 1960s, Latin American economists developed the theory
of economic dependence that has influenced African economists to propose similar
models for African and Asian development. Id.
10. See, e.g., Dolan, The Loni Convention and Europe's Relationship with the Third
World: A CriticalAnalysis, JouRNAL OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 369, 393 (1978). Commentators are divided on whether the Lom6 Conventions foster dependence of the
ACP on the EEC. See, e.g., Shaw, supra note 8, at 138. Some prefer to view the relationship between the EEC and the ACP as a part of a decolonization process. See, e.g.,
Zartman, Europe and Africa: Decolonization or Dependency?, 54 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 325, 340
(1976). Those critics of the Lom6 Conventions who advocate the dependency theory
say that EEC aid works against ACP development because it reinforces existing aid
partner concentration and the international division of labor. See Rajana, supra note
8, at 216.
11. See EUROPE, AGENCE INTERNATIONAL D'INFORMATION POUR LA PRESSE DOCU-

MENTS (No. 985) 2 (Feb. 2, 1978); Note, Toward Lomi Il: Perfecting the European Community'sAfrican Partnership,16 CASE W. RES.J. INT'L L. 459, 465 (1984). The composition of EEC exports to the ACP in 1975 consisted primarily of chemical products

(11.5%), manufactured goods (20.2%), machinery (47.8%), and other manufactures
(6.2%). During the same period the EEC imported 95-100% of its uranium and 5560% of its raw sugar, sisal, wood, aluminum ores/concentrates, and alumina from
the ACP States. J. RAVENHILL, COLLECTIVE CLIENTISM 38-39 (1985). EEC dependence on ACP raw materials grew between 1975, when the ACP exported 82.77% of
its most important commodities to the EEC, and 1982, when this figure was 83.95%.

Id. at 207.
12. Simmonds, The Second Lomi Convention: The Innovative Features, 17 COMMON
MET. L. REV. 415, 419-23 (1980).

13. Lom6 III, supra note 5, art. 130(1).
14. Id. art. 194(l)(a).
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materials. 15
This Note will analyze Lom6 III's private investment protection and promotion provisions' 6 to determine whether the
15. SeeJ. RAVENHILL, supra note 11, at 37-38.

16. Lomb III, supra note 5, arts. 240-47. The text of the articles is as follows:
Article 240
The Contracting Parties recognize the importance of private investment
for the promotion for their development co-operation and acknowledge in
this respect the need to take such steps as would promote such investment.
In this regard the Contracting Parties jointly and severally agree to:
(a) implement measures to encourage private economic operators who
comply with the objectives and priorities of their development co-operation
and with the appropriate laws and regulations of their respective States to
participate in their development efforts;
(b) accord fair and equitable treatment to such investors, and encourage
and create clear and stable conditions conducive to the participation of such
investors;
(c) maintain a predictable and secure investment climate and be prepared
to enter into negotiations on agreements which will improve such climate
and, in so doing, further mutual interests;
(d) promote effective co-operation amongst their respective economic operators.
Article 241
1. In order to accelerate further their development cooperation and the
expansion of directly productive investment, the Contracting Parties, using
the technical and financial assistance provided within this Convention, agree
to study measures which will facilitate an increased and more stable flow of
private capital and which will further enhance:
(a) joint financing of productive investments with the private sector;
(b) access by interested ACP States to international financial markets;
(c) the activity and effectiveness of domestic financial markets.
2. To this end, the Contracting Parties agree to review the economic, technical, legal or institutional obstacles which currently hamper such developments as well as the action required to remove these obstacles, with due.
respect for international commitments, in order to promote further the development of productive investment.
Article 242
1. Taking account of the link between investment decisions, the capacity of
the ACP States to generate adequate export earnings to service the investment and the ability effectively to support existing and new productive investment, the Community undertakes to explore ways and means to provide, within the framework of financial and technical co-operation:
(a) credit lines to finance imports of intermediate materials needed for the
export industries of a requesting ACP State;
(b) appropriate and effective support for export promotion.
2. Taking into account of the role of domestic development financing institutions as channel and intermediary for attracting private captial flows into
development co-operation, the Contracting Parties agree, within the framework of financial and technical co-operation, to encourage the setting-up or
strengthening of:

1986]

LOME III

639

provisions would actually promote the flow of capital needed
by the ACP States to meet their development goals, or whether
(a) national or regional financing institutions to finance exports and guarantee export credits;
(b) regional payment mechanisms that would facilitate intra-ACP trade.
Article 243
1. The Contracting Parties affirm the need to promote and protect either
party's investments on their respective territories, and in this context affirm
the importance of concluding between States, and in their mutual interest,
investment promotion and protection agreements which could also provide
the basis for insurance and guarantee schemes.
2. In order to further encourage European investment in development
projects of special importance to, and promoted by, the ACP States, the
Community and the Member States on the one hand, and the ACP States on
the other, may also conclude agreements relating to specific projects of mutual interest where the Community and European enterprises contribute towards their financing.
Article 244
1. The Contracting Parties agree to undertake a joint study of the scope
and appropriate mechanisms of a joint ACP-EEC insurance and guarantee
system, complementary to existing national systems, that could have a positive effect on the flow of private-sector resources from the Community to
the ACP States.
2. The Contracting Parties further agree to explore the use of private sector market insurance to insure additional private capital flows to the ACP
States.
Article 245
In order to promote the development of private investment flows, the
Community and the ACP States hereby agree, within the framework of this
Convention and in co-operation with other interested bodies, to:
(a) encourage the flow of information on investment opportunities between
financial or development finance institutions, other specialized financial institutions and other potential investors and sponsors by organizing periodic
investment promotion meetings, making available periodic information on
existing financial or other specialized institutions, their facilities and conditions and encouraging the establishment of focal points on ACP States;
(b) make a detailed analysis, taking full account of work being done in other
institutions, of possible net increases in the flow of funds for investment
financing that might result from greater use of co-financing and joint ventures and, in this regard, enable suggestions to be made to multilateral, regional and other institutions regarding ways and means of improving and
increasing the number of such arrangements in order to expand the funds
available to ACP States in the form of equity and long-term capital;
(c) strengthen, with financial and technical assistance for the Community,
existing activities to promote European private investment in the ACP
States by organizing discussions between any ACP State interested and potential private investors on the legal and financial framework which that ACP
State offers or might offer to a potential investor;
(d) encourage the dissemination, to all interested parties, of information on
the nature and availability of investment guarantees and insurance mechanisms to facilitate investment in ACP States, and encourage or prepare,
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these provisions merely perpetuate the elements of the historical colonial relationship' 7 that persisted under the prior Lome
wherever appropriate, the creation or expansion of such mechanisms in
ACP States, if necessary in collaboration with other appropriate agencies;
(e) provide assistance to small and medium-sized enterprises in ACP States
in designing and obtaining equity and loan financing on optimal terms and
conditions;
(f) explore ways and means of overcoming or reducing the host country risk
for individual investment projects that are in themselves viable and could
contribute to economic progress;
(g) help ACP States to:
(i) improve the quality of feasibility studies and the preparation of
projects with appropriate economic and financial effects;
(ii) introduce integrated project management covering the entire project development cycle within the framework of the development programme of the State.
Article 246
1. The Contracting Parties hereby recognize that the least-developed,
landlocked and island ACP States suffer from certain unique disadvantages
which render them less attractive to private investment.
2. The Contracting Parties therefore commit themselves to undertaking,
as soon as possible after the entry into force of this Convention, a joint
study to identify the specific measures it may be desirable to adopt in relation to those States in order to improve their attractiveness to investment.
Article 247
1. In order to improve understanding of the issues involved in private-sector flows and the effectiveness of attempts to encourage such flows, the Contracting Parties hereby agree that the Commission shall, with their assistance, produce regular reports for the information of the Council of Ministers on flows of investment, lending, payment arrears and capital
movements between the Community and the ACP States.
2. The Contracting Parties hereby agree that the issues relating to the promotion and protection of investment in their respective territories may be
the subject of discussions in the appropriate ACP-EEC co-operation forum
or of consultations between the ACP State concerned and the Community,
especially where particular investment promotion schemes are being implemented.
3. The Contracting Parties hereby agree to launch all the studies referred
to in this Chapter in the shortest possible time and, in any event, not later
than one year after the entry into force of this Convention. The result of
these studies will be submitted upon completion to the interested parties for
consideration and appropriate action, not later than two years after the entry into force of this Convention.
17. See infra notes 34-50 (discussion of the colonization of Africa). Some commentators argue that protection of private foreign investment under uncodified
rules, such as the doctrine of state responsibility, served as the "legal garb . . . to
cloak and protect the imperialistic interests of the international oligarchy during the
nineteenth century and the first part of the twentieth." C~staneda, The Underdeveloped
Nations and the Development of InternationalLaw, 15 INT'L. ORG. 38, 39 (1961); see also
Guha Roy, Is the Law of Responsibility of States for Injuries to Aliens a Part of Universal
InternationalLaw?, 55 AM.J. INr'L L. 863, 865 (1961). The doctrine of state responsi-
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Conventions.' 8 Part I of this Note will detail the historical relationship between the ACP States and the EEC countries, emphasizing the prior Lom6 Conventions.' 9 Part II will give the
background of Lom6 III, and will review the Convention's private investment provisions.2 ° Part III will analyze the effect of
article 243,21 regarding investment protection agreements,
and article 244,22 concerning investment insurance and guarantees, on the flow of private investment to ACP States.23 The
Note will conclude that the private investment provisions are
indeed a step toward promoting the economic development of
the ACP States, if two conditions are met. 24 First, the EEC and
ACP must fulfill the promises that they have made to study the
problems that discourage private investment and take substantive action based upon these studies.2 5 Second, the rules of
origin and the safeguard clause of the Lom6 III Convention
must be modified.2 6
I.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE ACP AND THE
EEC: AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
The present relationship between the EEC and the ACP

bility provides that the state shall be responsible for injuries to an alien's property
when the state expropriates or destroys it. See P. JEssuP, A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS

104 (1952). The doctrine's historical growth is one aspect of Western colonialism
and imperialism. Id. at 96.
18. See infra note 164 (discussion of the ACP's exports to the EEC during LonI6
I). Martin, supra note 8, at 223; Shaw, supra note 8, at 151.
19. See infra notes 27-212 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 213-69 and accompanying text.
21. Lom6 III, supra note 5, art. 243.
22. Id. art. 244.
23. See infra notes 270-313 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 299-321 and accompanying text.
25. The Joint Working Party on Investment, which is comprised of EEC and
ACP representatives, has not met. This group could not begin any of its studies on
investment guarantees until Lom6 III is ratified. Lom6 III, supra note 5, art. 247, see
supra note 5 (discussion of the ratification procedure for Lom6 III). Experts expect
the Joint Working Party to spend two years on the report. EEC-ACP: New Investment
Guarantee Scheme May Not See Light of Day Until Lomi IV, EUROPEAN REPORT (No. 1174
§ V), 2 (Nov. 9, 1985) (bi-weekly newsletter published by the European Information
Service). Any agreement based on the report will take another year to ratify. Id.
Negotiations for the successor ACP-EEC Convention would already have begun.
This means that any concrete measures would have to be incorporated in Lom6 IV.
Id.
26. See infra notes 123 and 160 and accompanying text (discussion of the negative impact of the rules of origin and the safeguard clause).
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evolved from the colonial empires developed by the European

nations to secure access to needed raw materials.

7

When

decolonization began in the twentieth century, European nations established preferential trade relations with their former
colonies, thus maintaining access to the raw materials previously supplied by those former colonies.2 8 Under the Treaty
of Rome, 29 many European nations granted their former colonies "associate status" with the EEC.3" The association continued through two formal agreements, the Yaounde Conventions, 3 after most of the Associates had already gained independence. 2 The Lom6 Conventions changed the relationship
between the EEC and the ACP from an association to a partnership.
However, critics have argued that the Conventions
did not create a true partnership and have done little more
than perpetuate the colonial system by securing EEC access to
the raw materials it needs for its manufacturing industries. 4
27. See E. RICE JR.,
(1970); S. EASTON, THE

THE FOUNDATIONS OF EARLY MODERN EUROPE 1460-1559
RISE AND FALL OF WESTERN COLONIALISM 11 (1964).

28

28. Yelpaala, The Lomi Conventions and The Political Economy of The African-Caribbean-Pacific Countries: A CriticalAnalysis of The Trade Provisions, 13 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. &

POL. 807, 812-13 (1981).
29. Treaty of Rome, supra note 3, arts. 131-36.
30. Implementing Convention Relating to the Association with the Community
of the Overseas Countries and Territories, May 25, 1957, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1
(Cmd. 5179-II) (official English translation), 298 U.N.T.S. 157 (1958) [hereinafter
cited as Implementing Convention]. "Associate status" was a relationship designed
to foster close economic relations between the European Community and the territories with which it previously had special relations, and to promote the latter's economic and social development. Treaty of Rome, supra note 3, art. 131. The objectives of the association were to establish reciprocal trade preferences between the
Associates and the Community, increase the Member States' investment in the Associates, and to grant the nationals and firms of the Associates and the Member States
the right of establishment. Id. art. 132.
31. Convention of Association Between The European Economic Community
and the Associated African States, July 20, 1963, 7 J.O. COMM. EUR. 1431 (1964),
reprinted in 2 I.L.M. 971 (1963) [hereinafter referred to as Yaound6 1]; Convention of
Association Between the European Economic Community and the African and Madagascar States Associated With the Community, July 29, 1969, 13 O.J. EUR. COMM.
(No. L282) 1 (1970), reprintedin O.J. EUR. COMM. SPECIAL EDITION SECOND SERIES 7

(Jan. 1974), reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 484 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Yaound6 II].
32. See J. Moss, THE LOMg CONVENTIONS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR
UNITED STATES 8 (1982).

THE

33. Partnership,Not Association: Yaoundi Convention to be Replaced, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY July 1973, at 20 [hereinafter cited as Partnership,Not Association]. EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY is a periodical which has, since 1979, been published under the new
name EUROPE.
34. See, e.g., Dolan, supra note 10, at 371; Comment, Title V of the 2nd Lomi Con-

1986]

LOME I
A.

643

From Colonial Empires to the Treaty of Rome

The European countries colonized Africa in two separate
waves during the fifteenth and nineteenth centuries.3 5 In the
former period, Portugal encouraged exploration along Africa's
west coast in order to investigate whether Portuguese gold
traders could bypass Moslem middlemen. 6 Portugal and
other European countries began to exploit Africa during the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. 7 Europeans established
trading posts on the west coast to receive slaves, gold, and
ivory brought by natives from the interior.
In the second half of the nineteenth century, political and
economic pressures led the European countries to resume
their colonial conquests. 39 The Industrial Revolution 40 caused
manufacturers to seek new markets for their increased production capacities. 41 Developing countries served the dual function of a market for manufactured goods and a source of raw
materials for these manufacturers. 4 2 To make this economic
relationship possible, Europeans imposed their concepts of administration and finance on the African people through colonial government.4 3
vention Between the EEC and ACP States.: A CriticalAssessment of the IndustrialCooperation
Regime as it Relates to Africa, 5 Nw.J. INT'L L. & Bus. 352, 363 (1983-84). For centuries
Africa has been a producer of commodities for Europe while the latter has engaged
in capital intensive and technologically advanced types of production. Id. One author claimed that Lom I continued this "[e]urocentric version of comparative advantage." Id.
35. See Martin, supra note 8, at 223.
36. See E. RICE, JR., supra note 27, at 28. Portugal embarked on a program of
exploration of the African continent led by Prince Henry the Navigator. See id. There
were other motives for the Portugese expansion into Africa. Prince Henry was hostile to Islam and wanted to measure the power of Islamic military forces in Africa. See
id. at 26.
37. See id. at 29.
38. See id.
39. See S. EASTON, supra note 27, at 11-12.
40. The Industrial Revolution, which had its starting point in the seventeenth
century, caused rapid social and economic change in nineteenth century Europe. See
E. PAWSON, THE EARLY INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION 14-15 (1979). The key features of
the Industrial Revolution were the change from domestic production to the factory
system, the expansion of overseas trade, and the agrarian revolution that allowed
much of the rural food producing population to leave the farms in order to work in
the factories. See A. TOYNBEE, THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION 58-66 (1884).
41. See S. EASTON, supra note 27, at 11.
42. See Martin, supra note 8, at 224.
43. See S. EASTON, supra note 27, at 11; Martin, supra note 8, at 224-25.
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The acquisition of colonies was increasingly a matter of
national prestige by the close of the nineteenth century.4 4 The
colonies served as a base for wielding military power.4 5 Some
European powers were concerned that emigration would deplete their military might and thus welcomed the colonies as
places where their burgeoning populations could go without
losing allegiance to their mother countries. 46 The European
zeal for colonies reached a zenith at the Conference of Berlin,
in 1884, where the European powers established
a system for
47
continent.
African
the
of
dividing the control
The European zeal for colonial possessions waned in the
twentieth century.4 8 World War I undermined the political
and economic basis of European imperialism.4 9 At the end of
World War I, the League of Nations 0 worked to establish the
mandate system to administer the former colonies of Turkey
and Germany. 5 ' The mandate system did not end European
colonialism.52 However, the system did affect the tenure of
44. See S. EASTON, supra note 27, at 12; D.K. FIELDHOUSE, ECONOMICS AND EMPIRE 1830-1914 65 (1973).
45. See D.K. FIELDHOUSE, supra note 44, at 65-66.

46. See id. at 66.
47. See W.D. SMITH, EUROPEAN IMPERIALISM IN THE NINETEENTH AND TWENTIETH
CENTURIES 119-20 (1982). The Conference of Berlin set the ground rules for Eu-

rope's imperial expansion in Africa. See W. ARNSTEIN, BRITAIN YESTERDAY AND ToDAY: 1830 TO THE PRESENT 164 n.2 (3d ed. 1976). Each power agreed to give notice
to the others to signify that it planned to occupy an area or declare a new protectorate. See id.
48. S. EASTON, supra note 27, at 123-25.
49. See W.D. SMITH, supra note 47, at 224. The World War of 1914-18 allowed
native Africans who fought to see the Europeans fighting Europeans and also created
political opportunities that encouraged resistance movements. See id. at 225.
50. The League of Nations was formed in 1920. After World War I world leaders realized the need to establish the League to achieve international peace and cooperation. See LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT preamble.
51. Id. art. 22. The League of Nations mandate system was established by article
22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. This system was needed to provide
administration for German and Turkish territories after World War I. H.D. Hall,
Mandates, Dependencies and Trusteeship, in 9 STUDIES IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORGANIZATION 30 n.3 (Carnegie Endowment For International

Peace ed. 1948). Germany had ceded its territories to the Allied Associated Powers
in the Treaty of Versailles. Id. The Turkish Empire renounced similar rights in the
Treaty of Lausanne. Id. Under the system, the mandates, former colonies and territories of Germany and the Turkish Empire, would receive administrative advice from
the mandatories. LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 22, para. 2. Each mandate was
treated according to the level of its economic development. Id. art. 22, para. 3.
52. See W.D. SMITH, supra note 47, at 225.
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European control.53 The breakdown of colonialism occurred
more rapidly after World War

J1.1

4

By the early 1960s, most of

the former European colonies had gained their independence.55
The founding of the EEC in 195756 brought another
change in the African territories' relationship with Europe.
France had fought for the association 58 of its former colonies
with the EEC during the negotiations for the Treaty. 59 France
had argued that its efforts to aid the development of its colonies and territories unfairly burdened its national budget and
industries. 60 France had already guaranteed prices to producers in its former colonies. 6' Furthermore, French loans and

grants totaling U.S.$3.1 billion were given to French dependencies between 1956 and 1959.62
The future EEC Member States were reluctant to share
France's burden, because they did not want to be accused of
either pursuing collective colonialism, or of indirectly providing financial aid for France's colonial wars by relieving its
treasury of the economic burden of the dependencies.6 3 The
Federal Republic of Germany and the Netherlands opposed
the inclusion of articles of association in the Treaty of Rome,
53. See id.
54. See id. at 225-26. The Western European powers became more amenable to
decolonization after World War II. See id. at 240. The Second World War changed
the structure of the world economy and world politics. See id. Europe's economic

recovery from the war depended on alliance with the United States. See id. The colonies were seen as an economic liability. See id.
55. See id.
56. See supra note 3.

57. See Serfaty, The United States, Western Europe, and the Third World: Allies and
Adversaries, in WORLD TRADE COMPETITION, WESTERN COUNTRIES AND THIRD WORLD
MARKETS 19 (Center For Strategic and International Studies ed. 1981); The European
Community And The Developing Countries 4 EUROPEAN DOCUMENTATION, 1977/1 (the Afri-

can territories became associated with the European Economic Community).
58. See supra note 30 (discussion of the association).
59. See E. FREY-WOUTERS, THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND THE THIRD WORLD:
THE LOMt CONVENTION AND ITS IMPACT 13 (1980).

President Charles de Gaulle of

France was accused of masquerading as a third world spokesman to mask his effort to
preserve Europe's access to minerals. See Serfaty, supra note 57, at 18.
60. SeeJ. RAVENHILL, supra note 11, at 48. The French Government had supplied
a large part of the government revenues of its colonies and territories. See id.
61. See id. at 48.
62. See id. at 49.
63. See id. France said that it was unfair for it to bear the burden of developing
its colonies through price supports and capital expenditure. See id. at 48.
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concluding that preferential trade relations with the Associates6 4 would reduce imports from other developing countries. 65 The future Member States of the EEC eventually conceded to France, however, when France conditioned its signature of the Treaty of Rome upon the association of its former
colonies with the EEC.6 6
I
As a result of France's persistence on the association issue,
Part IV of the Treaty of Rome stated that the territories that
had special relationships with Belgium, France, Italy and the
Netherlands would be associated with the Community. 67 The
Treaty, and the Implementing Convention 68 set forth the features of the association. 69 Under the Convention, the EEC received duty-free access to the Associates' markets.7 0 Each Associate pledged to grant each Member State the same preferential trade treatment that it granted to the Member State with
which it previously had special relations. 7 The Member States
established the European Development Fund (EDF) to complement the social and economic development efforts of the
Associates' governments.72 The Community committed U.S.
$581.25 million for the five-year term of the Implementing
73
Convention.
Many of the Associates gained their independence during
the late 1950s and early 1960s. 4 Soon after the Treaty of
64. See supra note 30.
65. See E. FREY-WOUTERS, supra note 59, at 13.
66. See id. at 13-14.
67. See Treaty of Rome, supra note 3, arts. 131-36.
68. See Implementing Convention, supra note 30.
69. See Treaty of Rome, supra note 3, arts. 131-36; Implementing Convention,
supra note 30, arts. 1-17. The Treaty designated the following group as Associates:
Senegal, the Sudan, Guinea, the Ivory Coast, Dahomey, Mauretania, the Niger and the Upper Volta, the Middle Congo, Ubangi-Shari, Chad and Gaboon, St. Pierre and Miquelon, the Comoro Archipelago, Madagascar and
dependencies, French Somali Coast, New Caledonia and dependencies, the
French Settlements in Oceania, Togoland, the Southern Antartic Territories, the French Trusteeship Territory in the Cameroons, the Belgian Congo
and Ruanda-Urundi, the Italian Trusteeship Territory in Somaliland and the
Netherlands New Guinea.
Treaty of Rome, supra note 3, annex IV.
70. See id. art. 133.
71. See id. art. 132.
72. See Implementing Convention, supra note 30, art. 1.
73. See id. annex A.
74. SeeJ. Moss, supra note 32, at 8. The French territories and Somalia gained
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Rome went into force in 1957, France called for a new convention that would provide a permanent framework for the Community's relationship with the newly independent African nations. 75 The EEC and the Associates began negotiations for
the first Yaounde Convention, 76 which was to replace the Implementing Convention of the Treaty of Rome. Some of the
EEC Member States disagreed over the Convention's trade
preference provisions.77 The Federal Republic of Germany
and the Netherlands did not want to give in to the Associates'
demands for the maintenance of existing Community trade
and tariff barriers to goods imported from non-associated developing countries.7 8 France and Belgium wanted to comply
with the Associates' demands. 79
Eventually, the parties
reached a compromise by providing for a procedure whereby
other countries could apply for associated status with the
EEC.80
B.

The Yaound Conventions and Other Euro-African
Relationships: 1962-1974

1. Yaounde I and Yaound6 II
Between 1964 and 1974, the EEC and the African Associates concluded two Yaounde Conventions:8 1 Yaound6 I, which
was signed in 1963,82 and Yaound6 II, which was signed in
1969.83 The eighteen African Associates, which were collec-

tively known as the Associated African States and Madagascar 84 (AASM), appeared to have bargaining power equal to
their independence by 1961. See id. at 4. The Belgian territories gained their independence in 1962. See id.
75. See E. FREY-WOUTERS, supra note 59, at 14.
76. Yaound6 I, supra note 31; SeeJ. RAVENHILL, supra note 11, at 53.

77. SeeJ. Moss, supra note 32, at 5.
78. See id.
79. See id.
80. Yaound6 I, supra note 31, art. 58.
81. Yaound6 I, supra note 31; seeJ. Moss, supra note 32, at 4-8. The Yaound6
Conventions were named for the capital of Cameroon where the Conventions were
signed in 1963 and 1969. The European Community and the Developing Countries, 4 EUROPEAN DOCUMENTATION 1977/1.

82. Yaound6 I, supra note 31.
83. Yaound6 II, supra note 31.
84. The Associated African States and Madagascar (AASM) group included all
the territories associated with the EEC under the Implementing Convention. See
Pinder, The Community and the Developing Countries:Associates and Outsiders, 12J. Common
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that of the EEC because of their independence.8 5 However,
the AASM did not succeed in concluding an agreement offering a significantly different relationship from the one that existed under the Treaty of Rome's Implementing Convention.8 6
Yaounde I, like the Implementing Convention, encompassed
the areas of trade expansion, 8 7 social and economic development,8 8 and the EEC's right of establishment in Associates.8 9
Reciprocal trade preferences90 continued under both Yaound6 Conventions. 9 The Community increased its aid to the
African Associates to 730 million European Currency Units
(ECU) under Yaound6 192 and later increased this aid to 918
million European Currency Units (ECU) under Yaound6 I1. 9
Mkt. Stud. 53, 54 n. 1 (1974); The European Economic Community and the Developing Countries, 4 EUROPEAN DOCUMENTATION 1/1977; COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES INFORMATION DIRECTORATE-GENERAL, LOMf III ANALYSIS OF THE EEC-ACP CON-

VENTION 1 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Lom6 III Analysis]; see supra note 69 and accompanying text.
85. See Dolan, supra note 10, at 371.
86. See C. COSGROVE TWITCHETr, A FRAMEWORK FOR DEVELOPMENT: THE EEC

AND THE ACP 8 (1981);J. Moss, supra note 32, at 6.
87. See Yaound6 I, supra note 31, arts. 2-15; Implementing Convention, supra
note 30, arts. 9-12.
88. Yaound6 I, supra note 31, arts. 17-30; Implementing Convention, supra note
30, arts. 1-5.
89. Yaound6 I, supra note 31, arts. 31-40; Implementing Convention, supra note
30, art. 8.
90. The reciprocal trade preferences consisted of the following: each Associate
received duty-free access to Community markets and in return pledged to reduce
duties on the Member States' exports to their countries. Yaound6 I, supra note 31,
arts. 2(1), 3(l); Yaound II, supra note 31, arts. 2(1), 3(1); see also, Note, supra note 11,
at 468-69. Some of the Associates favored retaining reciprocal trade preferences as a
means of preserving African dignity in their relationship with the EEC. See J.
RAVENHILL, supra note 11, at 64. Reciprocal preferences may have hindered the development of the Associates' own industries by allowing EEC manufacturers dutyfree access to the Associates' markets. See id. at 62.
91. Yaound6 I, supra note 31, arts. 2(1), 3(1); Yaound6 II, supra note 31, arts.
2(1), 3(1). Under article 133 of the Treaty of Rome, each Associate received dutyfree access to the EEC and in return pledged to reduce duties on the Member States'
exports to their countries. Treaty of Rome, supra note 3, art. 133(l)(2). The EEC
was willing to compromise on this issue. See E. FREY-WOUTERS, supra note 59, at 14.
In Yaound6 I, EEC trade preferences on some tropical goods shipped into the Associates' markets were abolished or reduced. Id.
92. Yaound6 I, supra note 31, art. 16. During Yaound6 I the EDF distributed
666 million ECU in the form of grants. Id. art. 16(a). The EIB issued loans totaling
64 million ECU. Id. art. 16(b).
93. Yaound6 II, supra note 31, art. 18. The EIB increased the amount it loaned
under Yaound6 II to 90 million ECU. Id. art. 18(b). The Development Fund made
grants of 748 million ECU and loans of 80 million ECU. Id. art. 18(a).
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The Associates said that their relationship with the EEC under
the Yaound6 Conventions did not promote their industrial development interests. 4 They complained that their tariff preferences over non-Associates in EEC trade were eroded by cuts
in the Community's common external tariff and by generalized
preferences. 9 5 The Associates' portion of the EEC's total imports had declined from 13.4% in 1958, to 7.4% in 1974.96
Furthermore, the Associates had made their greatest gains in
exports to markets that did not grant them trade preferences.9 7
The failure of the Yaound6 Conventions to increase the Associates' exports to the Community caused the Commission of
the European Community9 8 to recommend that there be no
Yaound6 III, and that the Community form a partnership with

the Associates.99
2.

The Lagos Agreement' 0 0 and the Arusha Accord' 0 '

Between 1962 and 1974, the EEC had tried to establish
preferential trade relations with British Commonwealth African countries that were not signatories to the Yaounde Conventions.10 2 Great Britain's application for membership in the
94. SeeJ. Moss, supra note 32, at 16.
95. See Partnership,Not Association, supra note 33, at 22. These preferences helped
the Associates only to maintain their share of the EEC market. SeeJ. Moss, supra note
32, at 12.
96. See Note, supra note 11, at 471, quotingJ. MATHEWS, ASSOCIATION SYSTEM OF
ThE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 46 (1977).
97. See J. Moss, supra note 32, at 11.
98. See supra note 3.
99. See Partnership,Not Association, supra note 33, at 20. The Commission plays a
vital role in deciding whether the EEC will conduct negotiations for a particular
treaty. See E. FREY-WouTERS, supra note 59, at 23. The Commission, when conducting negotiations for the EEC, presents the Council with reports containing Commission proposals based on the Commission's exploratory talks with the interested
state. See id. The Council then authorizes the Commission to proceed with negotiations. See id.
100. Agreement Establishing an Association between the EEC and the Republic
of Nigeria, July 16, 1966, reprinted in 5 I.L.M. 828 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Lagos
Agreement].
101. Agreement establishing an Association between the European Economic
Community and the United Republic of Tanzania, the Republic of Uganda and the
Republic of Kenya, 13 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 282) 54 (1970), reprinted in O.J. EUR.
COMM. SPECIAL EDITION SECOND SERIES 94 (Jan. 1974) [hereinafter cited as Arusha
Accord].
102. See, e.g., the Lagos Agreement, supra note 100 and the Arusha Accord, supra
note 101. The Commonwealth countries of Africa were Ghana, Sierra Leone, and
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EEC raised the issue of the treatment to be accorded to the
Commonwealth countries by the Community. 10 3 In 1966, Nigeria and the EEC concluded the Lagos Agreement, which
granted Nigeria associate status. 10 4 This agreement was never
ratified because French-Nigerian relations deteriorated during
the Nigerian Civil War.'0 5 In 1969, the Community and Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda concluded the Arusha Accord, a
trade and cooperation agreement. 0 6 However, the EEC failed
to reach trade agreements with other Commonwealth countries in Africa."0 7
3.

Negotiations for Lome I

Three factors led to the negotiations for the first Lom6
Convention. First, the EEC wanted to establish trade relations
with the British Commonwealth countries. 0 8 Second, the EEC
wanted to establish a new form of relationship with the Associates' 0 9 because of their dissatisfaction with the results of the
Yaound6 Conventions. 1 10 Third, the EEC's comprehensive
the territories of East and Central Africa. See I. JENNINGS, THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS 128 (4th rev. ed. 1961).
103. SeeJ. RAVENHILL, supra note 11, at 73. Great Britain wanted associated status for Commonwealth Africa, and the Caribbean and Pacific Islands. See id. Great
Britain knew that the EEC would not grant associated status to the countries of Commonwealth Asia because of their relatively advanced level of economic development.
See id.
104. See C. COSGROVE TWITCHETr, supra note 86, at 8.
105. See id.; R. COLLIS, NIGERIA IN CONFLICT 171 (1970). The Nigerian Civil
War erupted when the eastern portion of the country (including Biafra) seceded in
May of 1967. See id. at 157. France was sympathetic to Biafra and sent arms and
mercenaries. See id. Because of this Nigeria would not seek association with the
Community until 1973. See E. FREY-WOUTERS, supra note 59, at 27.
106. See Arusha Accord, supra note 101, art. 1. The Arusha Accord provided
that three countries' exports to the Community would benefit from tariff preferences
existing within the Community. See id. art. 2. See generally Ghai, The Association Agreement between the European Community and the PartnerStates of the East African Community, 12
J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 78 (1973-74).
107. See Oumar Sy, The Birth of the ACP Group, COURIER, Sept.-Oct. 1985, at 52.
108. Treaty concerning the accession of Denmark, Ireland, and the United
Kingdom of Britain and Northern Ireland to the European Economic Community
and to the European Atomic Energy Community, Jan. 22, 1972, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S.
No. 1 (Cmd. 5179-I), OJ. EUR. COMM. SPECIAL EDITION March 27, 1972, at 5 [hereinafter cited as Treaty of Accession]. The British Commonwealth Countries could become Associates with the EEC pursuant to Protocol 22 of the Treaty of Accession.
See infra text accompanying notes 113-14.
109. See generally supra text accompanying notes 68-69.
110. See Partnership,Not Association, supra note 33, at 20.
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development policy"' led the Community to'expand its rela2
tions with developing countries."t
The British Commonwealth countries had an opportunity
to establish relations with the EEC pursuant to Protocol No. 22
of the Treaty of Accession of the United Kingdom to the
EEC." 3 The Community offered the Commonwealth countries three options. "' None of these forms of relationship with
the Community proved satisfactory to the Commonwealth
countries." 5 The Commonwealth countries ignored the EEC's
deadline for response, and instead, began talks with the AASM
and the Arusha groups" 1 6 intending to create a unified bargaining position for talks between the African countries and
the EEC."17 These groups met through the Organization of
African Unity" 8 (OAU) and were able to formulate principles
for a common relationship with the EEC. 1 9
The Community moved to open negotiations for a new
111. LOMg III ANALYSIS, supra note 84, at 2.
112. See id. at 1-2. In 1972, the EEC decided to pursue a comprehensive worldwide development policy while preserving its policy of regional association. See id. at
1-2.
113. Treaty of Accession, supra note 108, Protocol No. 22.
114. Id. Protocol 22.
The Community made the following proposals:
1. Association under the successor convention to Yaound6 II.
2. New association agreements to be concluded under Article 238 of the
Treaty of Rome. These agreements would provide reciprocal rights in the
area of trade.
3. Trade agreements to expedite developing trade between the Commonwealth countries and the EEC.
Id.
115. See Pinder, supra note 84, at 58. Each alternative was construed as challenging the Commonwealth countries' sovereignty, in light of their political independence. See id. The Commonwealth countries also argued that reciprocal trade preferences, which were a feature of the relationships offered by the EEC, were not appropriate in light of the disparate levels of economic development between them and
the EEC. See id.;J. Moss, supra note 32, at 16.
116. See supra notes 84, 106, and accompanying text.
117. SeeJ. Moss, supra note 32, at 17.
118. Charter of the Organization of African Unity, May 25, 1963, 479 U.N.T.S.
39, 2 I.L.M. 766 (1963). The Organization of African Unity [hereinafter referred to
as "OAU"] was founded in 1963 to promote African unity, defend African sovereignty, and to set an agenda for harmonizing international co-operation policies of
African governments. See id. art. 2. See generally Gordenker, The UN and Cooperation in
Africa, in AFRICAN REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 13, 17 (D. Mazzeo ed. 1984).
119. See Pinder, supra note 84, at 61. The principles agreed upon by the OAU
were:
a. non-reciprocity in trade and tariff concessions;
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convention that would include not only the African countries,
but also several British Commonwealth countries of the Caribbean and Pacific.' 20 These parties accepted the invitation to
negotiate jointly.' 2' Throughout the talks, the African, Caribbean, and Pacific States maintained a unified bargaining posture. 22 The ACP insisted that reciprocal trade preferences be
2
omitted from the convention and that the rules of origin, 1
which determined the eligibility of ACP products for tariff
preferences, be revised to facilitate ACP industrial development. 12 4 In addition, the ACP demanded that its products
have duty-free access to EEC countries and that the Community establish a system guaranteeing stable prices for its princib. the extension on a non-discriminatory basis, toward third countries, of
the provisions on the right of establishment;
c. revision of the rules of origin so as to facilitate the industrial integration
of African countries;
d. revision of the provisions on the movement of payments and capital to
take account of the objective monetary independence in African countries
and their need for monetary cooperation;
e. the dissociation of EEC financial and technical aid from any particular
form of relationship with the EEC;
f. free and assured access to EEC markets for all African products, whether
or not they are subject to the common agricultural policy of the EEC;
g. the guaranteeing to African countries of stable, equitable and remunerative prices in EEC markets for their main products in order to allow them
to increase their export earnings;
h. no adverse effect on intra-African cooperation.
See id. at 61-62.
120. See Oumar Sy, supra note 107, at 52.
121. See id. The African Commonwealth countries, the AASM, the Arusha
groups and the Commonwealth countries of the Caribbean and the Pacific agreed, in
mid-1972, to jointly negotiate as a means of achieving a stronger negotiating position
with the EEC. See Ramphal, The ACP-the early years, COURIER, Sept.-Oct. 1985, at 8182.
122. See Oumar Sy, supra note 107, at 53. The African group supported the
principle that the three groups were really one negotiating group, and not merely
three groups speaking with one voice. This attitude continued through the negotiations in 1974. See id.
123. The rules of origin had been a part of the two Yaound6 Conventions. Yaound6 I, supra note 31, art. 2, annex to Convention; Yaound6 II, supra note 31, art. 2,
Protocol 1. The Community's purpose in creating the rules of origin was to ensure
that the exports of Associates who received tariff preferences from the EEC contained a minimum percentage of local content. McQueen, Lome and the Protective Effect
of the Rules of Origin, 16J. WORLD TRADE L. 119, 122 (1982). The requirement of local
content prevented third countries from shipping their goods to the Associates to take
advantage of their tariff preferences to the EEC. See id. at 119.
124. SeeJ. Moss, supra note 32, at 17-18.
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pal exports to the EEC.' 2 5 The EEC was more open to the
ACP's demands during these negotiations than during the Yaound6 negotiations, because Europe was experiencing a recession 12 6 and was facing the oil crisis of 1973,127 which created
uncertainty over its access to oil reserves.12 1 Several ACP
States had oil reserves or were under exploration by oil companies.1 29 The recession, the oil crisis, and the ACP States'
unified negotiating position allowed the ACP States to exercise
power that had not previously existed in the 30EEC's earlier
dealings with these underdeveloped countries.1
C.

Lom6 I The Birth of a PartnershipBetween
the EEC and the ACP

The signing of Lome I1' by the EEC and the ACP States
marked an important change in their relationship.1 2 The partnership between the EEC and the ACP began with a number of
significant gains for the ACP States.' 33 The parties agreed to
125. Seeid.
126. See Farnsworth, Europe's Technicians in ajob Scramble, N.Y. Times, Mar. 13,
1973, at 1, col. 1 (discussion of Europe's recession).
127. The oil crisis of 1973 was the result of three distinct historical developments that interacted to cause the supply of oil to be insufficient to meet world demand. See Penrose, The Development of Crisis, in THE OIL CRisis 39 (R. Vernon ed.
1976). The first of these developments was the increased bargaining power of the
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries [hereinafter referred to as "OPEC"]
with the international oil companies. See id. The second development was the Western world's growing dependence on OPEC oil. See P. ODELL, OIL AND WORLD
POWER: BACKGROUND TO THE OIL CRIsIs 200 (1974). The last factor was the United
States' support of the establishment and expansion of Israel in Palestine against the
Arab States' opposition. See P. ODELLSUpra. In 1973, OPEC's members agreed to set
unilateral prices for their oil, and some members cut back their oil production.
Mikdashi, The OPEC Process, in THE OIL CRISIS 204-05 (R. Vernon ed. 1976).
128. See Europe Expects to Add Oil Curbs, New 51 Cut in Arab Output May Cause 25%
Shortfall, N.Y. Times, Dec. 11, 1973, at 69, col. 1. Petroleum industry experts anticipated that Europe would experience a 25% shortfall in its petroleum supplies by the
end of 1974. See id. The Arab States' decision to reduce their production compounded Europe's economic problems, causing the recession in Europe to worsen.
Farnsworth,... They've Already Hit Some Places, N.Y. Times, Nov. 25, 1973, at DI, col.
5.
129. SeeJ. Moss, supra note 32, at 19.
130. SeeJ. RAVENHILL, supra note 11, at 94-97.
131. See Lom6 I, supra note 4. This Convention was signed on February 28,
1975 and was in force for five years. Id. art. 91.
132. See E. FREY-WOuTERS, supra note 59, at 253.
133. See Note, supra note 11, at 473-74. The ACP States also gained more preferential access to EEC markets than they had under the Yaound6 Conventions. See id.
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discontinue reciprocal trade preferences, 3 4 create the Centre
Centre), and establish a
for Industrial Development 3 5 (CID or
36
commodity price stabilization plan.'
During the negotiations, the ACP States insisted that reciprocal trade preferences be eliminated from the relationship
between the EEC and the ACP, because these preferences
were "out of the question .... bearing in mind the inequality"
1 37
in the trade relationship between the two organizations.
The ACP also reminded the Community that the General

Agreement on Tariffs and Trade13 8 (GATT) had recognized
that developing countries should not be required to grant reciprocal trade preferences to developed countries. 139 These
arguments and the ACP States' strong bargaining position
134. See E. FREY-WOUTERS, supra note 59, at 19.
135. Lom6 I, supra note 4, art. 36. Article 36 states:
A Centre for Industrial Development shall be set up. It shall have the following functions:
(a) to gather and disseminate in the Community and the ACP States all relevant information on the conditions of and opportunities for industrial cooperation;
(b) to have, at the request of the Community and the ACP States, studies
carried out on the possibilities and potential for industrial development of
the ACP States, bearing in mind the necessity for adaptation of technology
to their needs and requirements, and to ensure their follow-up;
(c) to organize and facilitate contacts and meetings of all kinds between
Community and ACP States' industrial policy-makers, promoters, and firms
and financial institutions;
(d) to provide specific industrial information and support services;
(e) help to identify, on the basis of needs indicated by ACP States, the opportunities for industrial training and applied research in the Community
and in the ACP States, and to provide relevant information and recommendations.
Id.
136. Id. arts. 16-24. The commodity price stabilization plan, which is popularly
known as Stabex, stabilizes ACP export earnings. See infra text accompanying notes
144-50.

137. See Oumar Sy, supra note 107, at 53. The African Countries were initially
divided over retaining reciprocal trade preferences. See id. The group opposing reciprocal trade preferences based their argument on the inequality in the trade relationship between the EEC and the ACP. See id. Eventually, all the African States
supported this view. See supra note 119.
138. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. 5,
T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 188 (1950). Its purpose was to reduce tariffs and
other barriers to trade and to eliminate discriminatory treatment in commerce. Id.
preamble.
139. Protocol Amending the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade to Introduce a Part IV on Trade and Development, Feb. 8, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1977, T.I.A.S.
No. 6139, 572 U.N.T.S. 320 art. 36 (1965).
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caused the EEC to agree to eliminate reciprocal trade preferences.

140

The second major gain to the ACP from Lom6 I was the

establishment of the CID to promote industrial development
in the ACP States. 1 4 ' The Centre gathers and disseminates, in

the Community and the ACP States, information on opportunities for industrial cooperation.' 42 The Centre carries out
studies on the potential for industrial development in ACP
States and organizes meetings and contacts between the Compolicy-makers, promotmunity and the ACP States' industrial
14 3
institutions.
financial
and
ers, firms,
The third achievement of Lom6 I was a price stabilization
plan, popularly known as Stabex,144 for the ACP States' com-

modity exports

45

to the Community. One of the ACP States'

major exports to the EEC is commodities 46 and the ACP had
been adversely affected by the full force of world market price
fluctuations. 4 7 The purpose of Stabex is to remedy the harm-

ful effects of instability of export earnings on the ACP States'
economies.' 4 8 An ACP State was eligible to apply for a transfer of funds, in the form of aid or loans, when the state's actual

earnings for an export product represented 7.5% or more of
its total export earnings 4 9 and the price for the product falls
140. See supra notes 126-30 and accompanying text.
141. See Lom6 I, supra note 4, art. 36.
142. Id. art. 36(a).
143. Id. art. 36(b)-(c).
144. Id. arts. 16-19.
145. Id. art. 17. The Stabex plan is applicable to the products listed in article 17
of Lom6 I, which includes varieties of groundnuts, cocoa, coffee, cotton, coconuts,
palm and kernel products, and wood. Id. The list also includes raw hides, skins and
leather, fresh bananas, tea, raw sisal, and iron ore. Id.
146. See K. FOCKE, FROM LOMf I TOWARDS LOMt 11 13 (1980). During the period
between 1975 and 1978, 30.6% to 41.6% of the ACP's exports to the Community
were foodstuffs. See id.
147. SeeJ. RAVENHILL, supra note 11, at 72.
148. Lom6 I, supra note 4, art. 16. The ACP States suffered from external trade
deficits as a result of the deterioration in commodity prices, because their gross national products (GNP) were highly dependent on commodity exports. See OECD,
WORLD ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE AND THE EVOLVING NORTH-SOUTH RELATIONSHIP

47 (1983).
149. Lom6 I, supra note 4, art. 17(2). The Stabex requirement is different for
the least developed ACP States listed in article 48 of Lom6. Id. The product had to
represent 2.5% of a least developed ACP States' total earnings from exports in order
for it to qualify to apply for a fund transfer. Id.
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7.5% below the reference level established by Stabex. 50
Lome I also contained two features that the ACP States
" ' These
perceived as obstacles to their development goals. 15
52 and the safeguard clause, 53
features, the rules of origin
were objectionable to the ACP States because they discour54
aged investment by third countries in ACP States.
The rules of origin defined which products would be designated as originating in an ACP State for the purpose of
granting preferential tariff access to the EEC.' 5 5 Originating
products were those whose value was added entirely in one or
more ACP States or in the Community.' 5 6 According to the
rules, a third country investor' 5 7 in an ACP State that imported
non-EEC or non-ACP intermediary materials for finishing in
an ACP State did not receive tariff preferences when it shipped
its goods to the EEC.' 5 8 Thus, under the rules of origin, the

investor from a third country was at a competitive disadvantage with EEC investors in an ACP State.' 5 9
The safeguard clause discouraged third country investment in ACP States. 60 In essence, the EEC reserved the right
to take measures to safeguard the economy of the Community
or of a Member State, or to safeguard a sector of the economy
of the Community or of a Member State, from serious disturbances 16 1 caused by Lome I's trade provisions.' 62 The EEC
150. Id. art. 19(2). The reference level was the average of an ACP State's export
earnings for a product for the prior four years. Id. art. 19(1). Least developed ACP
States had to experience a 2.5% fall in actual earnings for the product below the
reference level in order to qualify for a fund transfer. Id. art. 19(2).
151. See Note, supra note 11, at 461; see infra text accompanying notes 157-59.
152. Lomb I, supra note 4, Protocol 1; see infra notes 155-59 and accompanying
text.
153. Id. art. 10; see infra notes 160-63 and accompanying text.
154. See McQueen, supra note 123.
155. Lomb I, supra note 4, Protocol 1, art. 1.
156. Id., Protocol 1, art. l(a)-(b). Originating products also included those that
did not originate in an ACP State, but which had undergone sufficient working or
processing, as defined in article 3 of Protocol 1 in an ACP State. Id. art. 3.
157. For the purposes of this Note, a third country investor is an investor who is
not from an ACP or a Member State of the EEC.
158. Lom6 I, supra note 4, Protocol 1, art. 1.
159. EEC exporters from ACP countries are exempt from the rules of origin.
See id.
160. See Yelpaala, supra note 28, at 850-51.
161. Lomb I, supra note 4, art. 10.
162. See id. arts. 1-15.
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did not elaborate on what would constitute a serious disturbance. This ambiguity made it difficult to determine when the
Community would invoke the clause to limit ACP exports to
the Community. The safeguard clause discouraged investment
in ACP enterprises, because investors had to raise funds for
63
capital expansion from sales to developed countries.'
While Stabex helped to protect the ACP States' economies
from fluctuations in export earnings from commodities, the
ACP States exports to the EEC dropped below their pre-Lome
I level.t6" This development was attributed in part by the ACP
States to the institution of the EEC's Generalized System of
Preferences 65 (GSP) in 1971, which lessened the tariff advantage of ACP States

66

over other less developed countries. 16 7

D.

LomiH

The second Lom6 Convention (Lom6 II) took effect on
March 1, 1980.168 The ACP and the EEC were both disappointed with the terms of the Convention.' 69 Each of these
163. See Yelpaala, supra note 28, at 851. ACP States' economies center around
their exports. See Note, supra note 11, at 465.
164. SeeJ. Moss, supra note 32, at 35. Before Lom& I, 45.6% of the ACP's exports went to the Community. See id. During Lom6 I, only 38.4% of the ACP's exports went to the EEC. See id. ACP exports of manufacturers increased by only 30%,
not the 106% claimed by the EEC. See id. at 55. The reason for the discrepancy is the
Community's classification of natural uranium and its composites as manufactured
products. See id. Sixty percent of these ACP exports to the EEC came from only five
or six ACP States. See K. FOCKE, supra note 146, at 12. Thirty-two of the ACP States
contributed under one percent of the ACP's exports to the Community. See id. at 13.
165. The Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) extends preferential customs treatment to a limited number of agricultural products from less developed
countries (LDCs). Their manufactures and semi-manufactures are not subject to the
EEC's Common External Tariff. See E. FREY-WouTERS, supra note 59, at 178.
166. See Rewriting Lomi, ECONOMIST, Sept. 23-29, 1978, at 93. Ninety-nine and
two-tenths percent of the ACP's exports to the Community enter free of duty. See id.
167. SeeJ. Moss, supra note 32, at 53; Shaw, supra note 8, at 146. A comparison
of the tariff advantages granted to the ACP States with those granted under the GSP
reveals that out of the twenty-five most important ACP exports only seven enjoyed a
lower tariff than EEC imports from other LDCs. One must also note that the GSP
tariff for four of the seven exports in question was below the Common External
Tariff. See J. Moss, supra note 32, at 53.
168. See C. COSGROVE TWITCHETr, supra note 86, at 100-02.
169. The results of the ACP-EEC trade cooperation were disappointing under
Lom6 I and Lom6 II. See K. FOCKE, supra note 146, at 11-14 (results of Lom6 I trade
cooperation). The aid package fell per capita 20% in real terms between Lom6 I and
Lom6 II. See Lomi Convention: The community plays Scrooge, ECONOMIST, Oct. 15-21,
1983, at 66. Desmond Cartey, President of the ACP Council of Ministers called
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parties had had to make major concessions in order to reach an
70

agreement. 1

1.

The ACP's Negotiating Demands

The ACP States entered the Lom6 II negotiations demanding modification of the rules of origin,' clarification of
the safeguard clause,17 2 and an insurance program for mineral
export earnings. 73 The ACP wanted changes in the rules of
origin and the safeguard clause, because of the negative impact
that they had had on investment in ACP States. 1 74 Creating an
insurance program for mineral earnings was also a priority for
the ACP, because these earnings were subject to fluctuations
that disturbed its members' economies. 175
2.

The EEC's Demands

The EEC entered the negotiations for Lom6 II intending
to preserve Lom6 I, including the rules of origin and the safeguard clause, and proposing the addition of provisions pro176
tecting human rights and procuring investment protection.
The EEC Member States disagreed on the form of the investLom6 II a "1975 Lom6 model which was retreaded and put forward for dealing with
the problems of the 80's [which] could not withstand the task." See ACP Presidenthints
at possibility of no Lomi III, EUROPEAN REPORT, No. 904, § V, at 3 (Nov. 10, 1982).
The ACP States were disappointed with the Stabex program under LomE II. See
Kibola, Stabex and Lome Il, 18J. WORLD TRADE L. 32, 41 (1984). The ACP States
made requests for ECU 453 million that met the Stabex requirements, but these were
not satisfied because only ECU 112 million was available. See id. Overall, LomE II's
Stabex resources equaled only 24% of the requests submitted by the ACP States. See
id.
170. See C. COSGROVE TWITCHETr, supra note 86, at 95-96.
171. SeeJ. RAVENHILL, supra note 11, at 170.
172. See id. at 181.
173. C. COSGROVE TWITCHETr, supra note 86, at 112.
174. See text accompanying notes 151-63.

175. See Lom6 II, supra note 5, art. 49.
176. See C. COSGROVE TWITCHETr, supra note 86, at 100. The Member States

had expressed their concern for the international protection of human rights. See id.
at 98-99. They hoped that Lom6 II would include a provision enabling the EEC to
suspend aid when an ACP State was guilty of gross and persistant human rights violations. See Simmonds, The Lomi Convention: Implementation and Renegotiation, 16 CoMMON MKT. L. REV. 425, 446-47 (1979). The ACP States took the position that such a
provision would infringe upon their internal political autonomy. See id. at 447. For a
discussion of the EEC's human rights policy, see Young-Anawaty, Human Rights and
the ACP-EEC Lomi II Convention: Business as Usual at the EEC, 13 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. &
POL. 63 (1980).
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ment protection provisions. 177 The smaller Member States
wanted Lom6 II's investment provisions to call for the establishment of a multilateral protection agreement on the Community level. 178 Great Britain, France, and the Federal Republic of Germany, which had earlier concluded satisfactory bilat79
eral investment protection agreements with ACP States,
were against a multilateral accord, because it would require
them to sacrifice their trade interests for those of the entire
177. SeeJ. RAVENHILL, supra note 11, at 269.

178. See id. In the early 1970s, the EEC had focused on a Community insurance
system that would complement national investment insurance plans. 1973-1974 EUR.
PARL. Doc. (No. 208) 34 (1973). However, the emphasis shifted to measures primarily on the Community level by the end of the decade. See Commission Communication to
the Council, Need To Encourage Investment In Developing Countries and Guidelines For Such
Action, DOCUMENTS OF THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES COM (78) 23

final, at 4-5 (30 Jan. 1978).
179. Germany and France had investment protection agreements with the following ACP States:
Parties to Treaty
Date of Signature
France
Liberia
March 23, 1979
Mauritius
Mar. 22, 1973
Sudan
July 31, 1978
Zaire
Oct. 5, 1972
Germany
Cameroon
June 29, 1962
Central African Republic
Aug. 23, 1965
Chad
Apr. 11, 1967
Congo
Sept. 13, 1965
Ethiopia
Apr. 21, 1964
Gabon
May 16, 1965
Ghana
May 19, 1967
Guinea
Apr. 19, 1962
Ivory Coast
Oct. 27, 1966
Kenya
Dec. 4, 1964
Liberia
Dec. 12, 1961
Malagasy
Sept. 21, 1962
Mauritius
May 25, 1971
Rwanda
May 18, 1967
Senegal
Jan. 24, 1964
Sierra Leone
Apr. 8, 1965
Somalia
Nov. 27, 1981
Sudan
Feb. 7, 1963
Tanzania
Jan. 30, 1965
Uganda
Nov. 29, 1966
Zaire
Mar. 18, 1969
Zambia
Dec. 10, 1966
See ICSID, INVESTMENT PROMOTION AND PROTECTION TREATIES, Binder 2, indices, at
3-4 (compilation 1983).
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Community. 80 After a difficult period of talks, the EEC
achieved a unified position.' 8 ' To pacify the smaller Member
States, the Community proposal required that each ACP State
guarantee each Member State, in its investment protection
agreements, the same terms granted to the most favored Memwould have applied to both old and
ber State. 18 2 The 8proposal
3
new agreements.
3.

The Lome II Negotiations

During the negotiations for Lom6 II, the ACP lacked the
bargaining strength it had had during the negotiations for
Lom6 1.184 In the late 1970s, several important dialogues between developed and developing countries took place without
success.' 8 5 The ACP was unable to win EEC concessions to
most of its major demands. Over the course of the Lome II
negotiations, the EEC reminded the ACP States of the benefits
that they had already received from their relationship with the
Community. 186 The Community's willingness to give in to the
180. SeeJ. RAVENHILL, supra note 11, at 270.

181. See id.
182. See id. The phrase "most favored Member State" refers to the Member
State that had won the most favorable concession from an ACP State in its prior
investment protection agreements. See id. The proposal would operate like a "most
favored nation" clause which allows either of the two contracting parties to enjoy
greater privileges accorded by the other to another nation. See P. JEssUP, supra note
17, at 35.
183. SeeJ. RAVENHILL, supra note 11, at 271, quoting JOSE ALAIN FRALON, THE
NEW EEC-ACP CONVENTION: FROM Lomt I To LoMg II 208 (Brusselles: Agence
Europeenne d'Informations, 1979).
184. SeeJ. Moss, supra note 32, at 135. The oil crisis during the Lom6 I negotiations, see supra note 127, had reminded the EEC of its acute dependence on the ACP
countries for minerals. SeeJ. Moss, supra note 32, at 135. By the time of the Lom6 II
negotiations, the EEC had become less concerned about the security of its supply of
minerals, thus it was less inclined to accomodate ACP demands. See id.
185. Kirkpatrick, Lomi 11, 14 J. WORLD TRADE L. 352 (1980); Joekes & Kirkpatrick, The Results of UNCTAD V, 13J. WORLD TRADE L. 535 (1979). For example, the

United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD V) ended in June,
1979, without the conferees reaching an accord in areas of concern to third world
countries. SeeJoekes & Kirkpatrick, supra at 547. The topics at UNCTAD V included
interdependence, monetary issues, debt problems, commodities and protectionism.
See id. at 535-46. The Tokyo Round of multilateral trade negotiations became deadlocked over the issue of measures against protectionism. See Kirkpatrick, supra, at
352.
186. See Kirkpatrick, supra note 185, at 352. ACP negotiators

"...

were con-

stantly reminded of the unique position in which they were as beneficiaries of the
EEC." Ambassador Rainford, Chairman of the ACP Committee of Ambassadors dur-
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ACP's demand for an insurance plan for mineral earnings, by
creating the program popularly known as Sysmin,187 was primarily the result of the EEC's mineral dependence, rather than
the ACP's bargaining power.' 8 8
The EEC succeeded in achieving its major negotiating
objectives.' 8 9 Lom6 II contained both the main features of
Lome I and investment protection provisions.' 90 Each of
Lom6 II's partners had an interest in drafting effective investment protection provisions.' 9 ' The EEC wanted to encourage
its investors to develop ACP mineral exports. 192 The ACP
States, like many other developing countries, had begun to realize in the 1960s that private investment was essential for the
development of their mineral wealth.' 93 The ACP's members
showed a willingness to encourage investment, as long as investment protection measures did not infringe upon their soving the Lom6 II negotiations, Lomi II: "An improvement", but it is hoped that the spirit of
partnershipwill be "rekindled.", COURIER, (spec. ed.) Nov. 1979, at 24, 25.

187. Lom6 II, supra note 5, art. 49 (defines the Sysmin program). This was a
very limited gain because the Community's negotiators handed its proposals to their
ACP counterparts on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, shortly before the deadline for the
end of the negotiations. See Martin, ACP-EEC Cooperation in Mining, Energy and Investment, COURIER, May-June 1982, at 25. ACP States that derive 15% or more of their
export earnings from minerals covered in article 150 of the Lom6 II Convention,
Lom6 II, supra note 5, art. 53, may receive aid when they have had or can anticipate a
drop of 10% or more in their exports or production capacity. Id. art. 52. This aid, in
the form of special financing, must be reimbursed on the same terms and conditions
as a special loan. Id. art. 56. Special loans have a maturity period of 40 years and
bear interest at the rate of 1% per annum. Id. art. 102.
188. SeeJ. Moss, supra note 32, at 107-10. EEC investment in the ACP mining
sector had not been keeping up with the projected future mineral needs of Europe.
See id. at 107. Sysmin helped remedy the effects of declining investment in the ACP
mining sector by providing aid to maintain ACP mineral export capacity. Lom6 II,
supra note 5, art. 49.
189. See supra text accompanying note 176. However, the Community did not
persuade the ACP to include a human rights clause in Lom6 II. See C. COSGROVE
TWITCHETr, supra note 86, at 96.

190. Lom6 II, supra note 5, arts. 60-64.
191. See E. I. NWOGUGU, THE LEGAL PROBLEMS OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 33 (1965). The Lomb II negotiations nearly collapsed because

of the Community's insistence on the acceptance of its proposal. See Voss, The Protection and Promotion of European Private Investment in Developing Countries-An Approach Towards a Concept For a European Policy on Foreign Investment: A German Contribution, 18
COMMON MKT. L. REV. 363, 381 (1981).
192. SeeJ. Moss, supra note 32, at 110; see supra note 188 (discussion of the declining level of EEC investment in the ACP mining sector).
193. See E.I. NWOGUGU, supra note 191, at 33.
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ereignty. 194 However, the ACP viewed the EEC's proposed investment provisions as doing just that, 9 5 insofar as they would
have allowed the EEC Member States to obtain new rights
under their bilateral investment agreements. 96 The ACP
States enter new
would have preferred that the EEC Member
19 7
negotiations to acquire these rights.
4.

Lome II: Ambiguous Investment Provisions

As a result of the ACP States' failure to accept the EEC's
proposal,' 9 8 and the compromises the parties made in agreeing
on a provision,19 9 Lom6 II contains ambiguous articles on investment protection and promotion. Article 64 states that the
joint declaration 0 0 governed the treatment of investors.2 0 ' In
this joint declaration, the ACP recognized that, as of the date
of Lome II's ratification, investments of EEC Member States
would not be subject to discriminatory treatment.2 0 2 Therefore, investment protection agreements entered into before
the Convention would not be covered by the "right" of nondiscriminatory treatment.20 3
During the negotiations, the ACP States insisted that the
194. See J. Moss, supra note 32, at 115.
195. See supra text accompanying notes 181-82.
196. SeeJ. RAVENHILL, supra note 11, at 270-71.
197. See id. at 271.
198. See id.
199. See id.
200. The joint declaration is annexed to Lom6 II. See Lom6 II, supra note 5,
annex 9.
201. See id. art. 64.
202. See id. annex 9(3)-(4). The joint declaration did not contain a clear definition of discriminatory treatment. Member States' agreements entered into after
Lom6 II's ratification would serve as reference agreements. Id. (2)(a)-(b). Such reference agreements would provide a contingent standard of investment protection.
See Z. KRONTOL, PROTECTION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT 45 (1972). The level of protection given by article 64 is dependent upon the rights accorded to individual Member
States in their agreements with the ACP States. Lom6 II, supra note 5, annex 9(2)(a)(b).
203. Id. annex 9(1). As a result of the joint declaration's prospective effect, the
Member States that entered into agreements with ACP States before Lom6 II's ratification were able to operate under more favorable terms than were Member States
that never had agreements with ACP States before Lom6 II's ratification. See J.
RAVENHILL, supra note 11, at 272. Articles 60-64 and the joint declaration did not
improve investment protection agreements.
available to more Member States. See id.

They merely made such agreements
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word "right" be changed to "principle. 2 °4 The ACP states
were concerned that potential investors would think that there
were substantial risks in investing in an ACP State, if the ACP
had to grant the EEC investment protection provisions. 20

5

Af-

ter Lom6 II was signed, the co-presidents of the ACP-EEC
Council of Ministers exchanged letters on the interpretation of
the joint declaration that reduced the protection it offered to
EEC investors. 20 6 The co-presidents said that the "right" to

non-discriminatory treatment depended on the conclusion of
bilateral agreements and that the word "right," as used in the
statement in the joint declaration, was the equivalent of the
word "principle."207

Commentators considered the results of Lom6 II to be
more disappointing than those of Lom6 1.208 Lom6 II failed to
meet requests for fund transfers under the Stabex program,20 9
which had been regarded as one successful feature of Lom6
1.2 10 Lom6 II's joint declaration on investment protection did
little to create a stable investment environment. 21 ' The Community's recognition of this continuing instability in the area of
investments was revealed by the EEC's efforts to incorporate
private investment protection provisions into
more effective
2 12
Lom6 111.

204. See Voss, supra note 191, at 365.
205. SeeJ. RAVENHILL, supra note 11, at 271.
206. See id. at 272.

207. See Voss, supra note 191, at 365. The author claims that the change in the
language downgraded the amount of protection offered by the joint declaration. See
id. at 364-65.
208. See supra note 169.
209. See supra note 169.

210. See Kibola, supra note 169, at 38.
211. See Comment, supra note 34, at 386.
212. The European Parliament prepared a report on the proposed content of
the third Lom6 Convention that contained particular recommendations for promoting private investment in ACP States. The Parliament suggested:
1. setting up and putting into force proper arrangements for protection of
investments, repatriation of profits and payments of trading debts (but
avoiding the Community itself becoming a guarantor).
2. better linking onto national development plans of the effects on imports
and exports of investment from abroad.
3. the creation, by appropriate political and economic measures by national governments, of a climate in which indigenous and foreign investment will take place and flourish.
4. particular assistance might be given to the better provision of risk capital by local banking systems.
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II.

THE INVESTMENT PROVISIONS OF LOME III
2 3 and the Sysmin 21 4
While Lome III retains the Stabex
programs, financial and technical cooperation, 2 " and the ACP
States' preferential access to the EEC,21 6 it differs from Lom6 I
and Lom6 11,217 insofar as the parties were able to agree on
more detailed private investment protection and promotion
provisions.21 8 The final provisions, set forth in articles 240 to

247, are the product of a great compromise between the ACP
and the Community. 21 9 As a result, these articles are not selfexecuting. 220 Most of the investment provisions call for action
based upon studies that the ACP and the EEC will conduct
some time after Lomb III's ratification. 2 At the present time,
articles 240 to 247 are an integrated set of promises to review
the problems that discourage private investment in ACP countries and to study investment protection and promotion plans
with a view to future action.2 2 2
A.

The Negotiationsfor Lome III

The negotiations for Lom6 III began in October of 1983,
when the EEC's existence was threatened by the world recession and internal disputes over the Community's finances.2 28
1983-1984 EUR. PARL. Doc. (No. 605) 97 (1983).
213. Lom6 III, supra note 5, arts. 147-74.
214. Id. arts. 176-84.
215. Id. arts. 185-239.
216. Id. arts. 129-30.
217. The new Convention contains innovative titles on social and cultural cooperation. Id. arts. 114-28. These provisions cover the enhancement of human resources and the promotion of the cultural identities of the ACP peoples. Id.
218. Id. arts. 240-47.
219. See infra notes 236-37 and accompanying text. The division of responsibilities between the Member States and the Community precluded Lom6 III from containing detailed investment insurance provisions. LoMf III ANALYSIS, supra note 84,
at 50.
220. See Lom6 III, supra note 5, art. 240 (article implementing the investment
title).
221. See id. art. 247(3).
222. See id. arts. 240-47.

223. See Lewis, Common Market Chiefs in Crucial Parley Today, N.Y. Times, Dec. 4,
1983, at 3, col. 1. In December, 1983, political analysts agreed that the EEC had to
formulate a solution to the Community's financial problems. See id. Great Britain,
France and the Federal Republic of Germany wanted the Community to reduce its
subsidies to farmers under its agricultural policy. See id. Great Britain said that it
should not have to contribute more to the EEC than it received in return. See N.Y.
Times, Dec. 6, 1983, at D22, col. 4. See generally EUROPE'S ECONOMY IN CRISIS (R.
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Both the EEC's instability and the partners' dissatisfaction with
the results of Lome II affected the negotiations. 224 The reasons
for the parties' dissatisfaction with Lom6 II varied, as did their
proposed remedies. 2 5
The ACP leaders criticized Lom6 II, because the Convention failed to halt the decline in the level of ACP exports to the
EEC. 2 26 The ACP States also complained that the financial aid
that they had received under the Stabex program during Lom6
II was unsatisfactory.22 7 The fund was unable to satisfy a large
percentage of requests for fund transfers, 228 and the ACP leadership hinted that there would be no Lom6 I1.229
The EEC Commission recognized that renegotiating the
Lom6 Conventions every five years unnecessarily called into
question the stability of the ACP-EEC relationship. 23 0

The

Commission said that a permanent convention would provide
a lasting framework for relations and development cooperation between the EEC and the ACP. 23

However, the ACP and

Dahrendorf ed. 1982) (discussion of Europe's economic crisis from the perspective of
each Member State).
224. See Lomi Convention: The community plays Scrooge, ECONOMIST, Oct. 15-19,
1983, at 66. The ACP States were particularly disappointed that most of the cooperative efforts of the ACP and the EEC were plagued by a lack of funds. See ACP/EEC
Negotiations: Shearer and Cheysson Open Ministerial Conference, Asking For "Quantitative
Leap", EUROPE AGENCY INTERNATIONALE D'INFORMATION POUR LA PRESSE (No. 3786)

(n.s.) 5 (Feb. 10, 1984).
225. See ACP Presidenthints at possibility of no Lomi III, EUROPEAN REPORT (No. 904)
§ V, at 3 (Nov. 10, 1985); MEMORANDUM ON THE COMMUNITY'S DEVELOPMENT POLICY,
BULL. EUR. COMM. 20 (Supp. 5/82 4 Oct. 1982).
226. Oj. EUR. COMM. (No. C 39) 10 (1983) (Statement by the EEC-ACP Consultative Assembly at its Nov. 3, 1982, meeting).
227. See Kibola, supra note 169, at 47.
228. See id. at 38-4 1. In 1981 the Stabex program was able to meet only 24% of
the requests for transfers. Stabex, Financing Decisions for 1981, COURIER, Nov.-Dec.
1982, at I. The program's resources were at ECU 112 million but, requests for transfers totaled ECU 453 million. See id.

229. See ACP Presidenthints at possibility of no Lomi III, EUROPEAN REPORT (No. 904)
§ V, at 3 (Nov. 10, 1982). Desmond Cartey of Trinidad and Tobago, President of the

ACP Council of Ministers, stated, in a November 3, 1982, speech to the ACP-EEC
Consultative Assembly, that many ACP States had been hesitant to sign a second
Lom6 Convention. See id. He used language suggesting that the ACP States were
considering not negotiating a third Lom6 Convention. See id.
230. MEMORANDUM ON THE COMMUNITY'S DEVELOPMENT POLICY, BULL. EUR.
COMM., Oct. 4, 1982, at 20 (Supp. 5/82). The Commission said that renegotiation of
the entire ACP-EEC relationship every five years was unnecessary because the EEC
and the ACP would not fail to renew their relationship. Id.

231. Id. at 20-21.
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the EEC decided Lome III would have a five-year term.2 32
The negotiations for Lome III began at the first Ministerial Conference at Luxembourg on October 6, 1983.233 Despite of their different views on the problems plaguing the
Lom6 Conventions, both the EEC and the ACP agreed that increasing capital to the ACP States would further their mutual
aim of promoting ACP development.2 3 4 Both parties wanted
to negotiate concrete investment provisions. 2 35 Intra-Community conflict 2 3 6 and the ACP's demand that the EEC guarantee
ACP access to European capital markets, as a condition for ac237
hampered the negotiacepting an investment provision, 23
tions.
The EEC's lack of foreign affairs powers under the Treaty
of Rome limited the Community in negotiating an investment
protection code for Lome 111.238 Article 113 of the Treaty of
232. Lom6 III, supra note 5, art. 291. Lom6 III has a five-year term. Id.
233. See Structure of the ACP-EEC Negotiations, COURIER, Jan.-Feb. 1985, at 26-27.

234. ACP-EEC Consultative Assembly, Luxembourg Sept. 19-21, 1984, Resolution taking into account the Eighth Annual Report of the ACP-EEC Council of Ministers on the state of implementation of the Lom6 Convention and the prospects for
the subsequent new Convention, 27 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 282) 15 (1984). During
the negotiations, both the ACP and the EEC recognized that Community aid could
represent only a small percentage of the capital requirements of ACP States' development needs. See Namaliu, "In the end the dictates of mutual self-interest and interdependence which characterizeACP-EEC economic relations prevailed," COURIER, Jan.-Feb. 1985,
at 4, 5. Private investment in ACP enterprises was found to be essential to the development of ACP States. See Thorn, "A sense of responsibility, " COURIER, Jan.-Feb. 1985,
at 9, 11. The ACP/EEC Consultative Assembly passed a resolution calling for measures related to the promotion of investment. 27 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. C 282) 15
(1984).
235. Statement by Edgard Pisani, Commissioner for Development, to the ACPEEC Consultative Assembly, September 20, 1984, reprinted in EUROPE AGENCE
D'INFORMATION POUR LA PRESSE DOCUMENTS (No. 1323) 6-7 (Sept. 26, 1984).
236. See supra note 212. The European Parliament was opposed to any plan that
would require the Community to act as a guarantor. 1983-1984 EUR. PARL. Doc.
(No. 605) 97 (1983).
237. ACP-EEC: Implementation of Negotiation Structure For Renewal of Lome Convention, EUROPE AGENCE INTERNATIONAL D'INFORMATION POUR LA PRESSE (No. 3705) 9

(Oct. 8, 1983). The President of the Committee of ACP Ambassadors said that the
two should go hand-in-hand, while speaking at a joint meeting of the ACP and the
EEC Council. Id.
238. See Treaty of Rome, supra note 3, art. 113(2). The Treaty of Rome only
grants the Community the power to conclude trade agreements based upon a common commercial policy. See Voss, supra note 191, at 376. The Member States cannot
exercise concurrent power with regard to the EEC's common commercial policy.
Opinion of the Court Given Pursuantto Article 228 of the EEC Treaty of 11 November 1975,
1975 E. COMM. CT. J. REP. 1355, 1364, [1976 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP.
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Rome permits the Community to establish a common commercial policy. 239 However, under article 113, the Community
must defer to the Member States' bilateral investment protection policies, because such policies are foreign affairs matters
and beyond the scope of the Community's common commercial policy. 24 0 Despite these limitations and differences, the
Lom6 partners were able to reach a compromise on private investment provisions. 241

B.

The Private Investment Provisions

The purpose of the investment title, as set forth in article
240, is the promotion of investment for the development goals
of the EEC and the ACP. 24 2 The EEC and the ACP will implement measures 243

to encourage "private

economic opera-

tors 2 4 4 who complement their development priorities and
objectives to participate in their development efforts.2 4 5 To
accomplish this end, the ACP and the EEC pledged to create a
stable investment environment, promote effective cooperation
among their respective investors and treat these investors eq(CCH) 8365, at 7643. There has been some dispute over what is encompassed in
the common commercial policy, because it is the
...outcome of a progressive development based upon specific measures
which may refer without distinction to 'autonomous' and external aspects of
that policy and which do not necessarily presuppose .... the existence of a
large body of rules, but combine gradually to form that body. Id. at 1363.
239. Treaty of Rome, supra note 3, art. 113.
240. Id. art. 113(i). Foreign investment policy does not come within the scope
of the common commercial policy. See Voss, supra note 191, at 376. The EEC Council has issued a decision based on article 113 calling for the gradual standardization
of Member States' trade accords with third countries. Council Decision No. 69/494
of Dec. 16, 1969, 12 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No.L 326), reprinted in O.J. EUR. COMM. Special
Edition (Dec. 1972), 2 COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH)
3837. This decision does riot
affect the Member States' capacity to conclude bilateral investment protection agreements, because the EEC's trade policy is not coextensive with Member States' foreign
investment policies. See Voss, supra note 191, at 377.
241. See LOMk ANALYSIS, supra note 84, at 49; see A Race To the Finish-'"Final"
EEC/ACP Negotiating Conference?, EUROPEAN REPORT, (No. 1073) 6 (Oct. 6, 1984) (biweekly newsletter published by the European Information Service).
242. Lom6 III, supra note 5, art. 240.
243. The ACP and the EEC will conduct studies to identify the measures necessary to promote private investment in ACP States. Id. arts. 240-47. For the text of
articles 240-47, see supra note 16.
244. "Economic operators" are ACP or EEC investors. Id. art. 240(a)-(b).
245. Id. art. 240(a).
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uitably once the Convention has been ratified. 4 6
Articles 241 and 242 call for the ACP and the EEC to
study methods of increasing the stable flow of private capital
and methods for providing financing as means of encouraging
private investment.2 4 7 Specifically, the EEC and the ACP plan
to study ways to enhance joint financing of investments with
the EEC's private sector, ways to establish credit lines to finance the importation of intermediate materials 248 needed for
ACP export industries, and ways to create national or regional
institutions 2 49 to finance exports. 2 5' The EEC conceded to the
ACP on the issue of ACP access to EEC capital markets, 251 and
studies are planned to determine how interested ACP States
may gain access to international financial markets.2 5 2
In article 243(1), the ACP and the EEC reiterate the need
to promote investment in their respective territories.2 5 3 That
article calls for both bilateral 2 54 and multilateral 2 55 investment
protection agreements: 2 56 agreements may take a multilateral
form only when there are specific projects to which the Community and a European enterprise have contributed financ25 7
ing.
Article 244 of Lome III authorizes the ACP and the EEC
246. Id. art. 240(b)-(d).
247. Id. arts. 241-42.
248. Id. art. 242(l)(a). Intermediate materials are semi-finished products. See
McQueen, supra note 123, at 127. ACP States do not have the manufacturing capacities needed to provide each other with intermediate products for finishing. See id.
They must therefore look to the Community and third countries for these products.
See id.
249. Studies to establish such institutions may prove inconclusive, because most
developing countries do not have large outflows of direct investment capital. United
Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations, TransnationalCorporationsin World Development Third Survey, U.N. Doc. ST/CTC/46, 31 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Transnational
Corporations].
250. Lom6 III, supra note 5, art. 242(2)(a).
251. See supra note 237 and accompanying text (discussion of ACP's States' demand for access to EEC capital markets).
252. Lomb III, supra note 5, art. 241(1)(b).
253. Id. art. 243(1).
254. Bilateral investment protection agreements are agreements between a capital exporting country and a capital importing country. Z. KRONFOL, supra note 202, at
30.
255. Multilateral investment protection agreements are agreements between
more than two capital exporting and capital importing countries. See id.
256. Lomb III, supra note 5, art. 243(l)-(2).
257. Id. art. 243(2).
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to undertake a study of the scope of and appropriate mechanisms for a joint investment insurance program. 25 8 However,

the joint study of such a system was limited by the stipulation
that such a system complement existing national systems. 2 59
In article 245, the ACP and the EEC announce their commitment to increase the flow of information on investment opportunities in ACP States and to conduct studies on ways to
achieve a net increase in the flow of capital to the ACP.26 ° The
ACP and the EEC will organize investment promotion meetings to establish contacts between financial and development
finance institutions,2 6 ' and investors and agencies handling investment guarantee systems. 26 2 The Community and the ACP

pledged to study the possibility that co-financing and joint ventures would result in a net increase in funds, and to take suggestions on increasing the number of such arrangements.268
They also promised to conduct a study to identify measures for
making the least developed ACP countries 264 more attractive
for investment. 65
Article 247, the implementing provision of the investment
title, requires both the ACP and the EEC to produce regular
reports for the ACP Council of Ministers 266 on the flow of investment, lending, payment arrears and capital movement between the EEC and the ACP States.267 Discussions on protection and promotion are to be held, when necessary, in either
the appropriate ACP-EEC forum or between the ACP State
concerned and the Community. 268 All of the studies listed in
articles 240 to 247 are required to commence within one year
258. Id. art. 244(1). This protection system would provide insurance coverage
for host country expropriation of a substantial portion of a foreign enterprise's property, for loss due to war, revolution, or insurrection or for inconvertibility of local

currency. See

INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW CENTER, NEGOTIATING
DRAnING INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS 149-50 (1966).

259.
260.
261.
262.

AND

Lom6 III, supra note 5, art. 244(1).
Id. art. 245(a)-(b).
Id. art. 245(a).
Id. art. 245(d).

263. Id. art. 245(b).
264.
art. 257.
265.
266.
267.
268.

The least-developed ACP States are listed in article 257 of Lom6 III. Id.
The Convention does not state what constitutes a least-developed state. Id.
Id. art. 246(2).
See supra note 4 (discussion of the ACP Council of Ministers).
Lom6 III, supra note 5, art. 247(1).
Id. art. 247(2).
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269
of the ratification of the Convention.

III.

INCREASING INVESTMENT IN ACP STATES: AN
ANALYSIS OF ARTICLES 243 AND 244
A.

The Obstacles to Investment in ACP States

The biggest obstacle to private investment in ACP States
is investors' fear of government expropriation of their investments without adequate compensation. 270 Articles 243 and
244 do not deal with this obstacle, because they do not contain
detailed provisions on a multilateral investment protection
agreement or on an ACP-EEC insurance program, the two
most effective means of promoting investor confidence. 2 7 '
1.

Overt and Covert Government Expropriation

Businessmen prefer to invest in developing countries with
a commercial foundation 2 72 upon which they may build their
enterprises. Such a foundation may consist of an industrial
network, a credit system, political stability, and experienced
workers and management.2 7 3 Although a deficiency in any of
these areas may discourage investment, the possibility of government expropriation is the single most important factor in
the investment decision.2 74
Government expropriation of foreign-owned enterprises
269. Id. art. 247(3).
270. See E.I. NWOGUGU, supra note 191, at 21-24.
271. See id. at 66; Voss, supra note 191, at 369. Drafting a multilateral treaty or
investment code is difficult primarily because of the compromises required in order
for all the parties to agree on a final draft. Most of the efforts to draft multilateral
investment protection agreements have been ineffective or meaningless because of
the reservations attached by some of the signatories or because they contained vague
terms. For a critique of these multilateral investment protection agreements, see Z.
KRONFOL, supra note 202, at 30-35.
272. See C. GOYBET, THE SECOND CONVENTION OF LoMk 4 (1982).
273. See id. at 386. Private investment is not a panacea for all that ails underdeveloped countries. They must overcome other problems such as their lack of institutions, skills, and wealth. Address by Dieter Frisch to the Committee on Developing
Countries, THE LOME CONVENTION: PRACTICAL ASPECTS PAST EXPERIENCE AND FUTURE PROSPECTS (30 Nov. 1984), reprintedin DIRECTORATE GENERAL FOR INFORMATION
DEVELOPMENT, COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, EUROPE INFORMATION
DEVELOPMENT (X/57/1985 Mar. 1985), at 14-15; Group of Seven Ready to Ensure Greater
Role of PrivateSector in Lomi, EUROPEAN REPORT (No. 1115) § V, at 6-7 (Mar. 16, 1985)

(bi-weekly newsletter published by the European Information Service).
274. See E.I. NWOGUGU, supra note 191, at 21-24; Comment, supra note 34, at
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in developing countries may be either overt 2 75 or covert. 2 76
Overt expropriation occurs when a government nationalizes an
enterprise. 27 United Nations resolutions and declarations on
sovereignty have catalyzed expropriation.2

7

'

The failure of

many ACP States to follow the Hull Doctrine,279 which requires an expropriating government to pay adequate compensation for that which it has taken, has discouraged many companies from expending money for major projects in developing countries without some guarantee against expropriation.28 0
Private investors are more discouraged by covert expro385-86. See generally Burton & Inoue, Expropriationsof Foreign-OwnedFirms in Developing
Countries: A Cross-NationalAnalysis, 18 J. WORLD TRADE L. 396 (1984).
275. See E.I. NWOGUGU, supra note 191, at 22-23 (the author uses the term "disguised expropriation" to refer to covert expropriation).
276. See id.; Voss, The Protectionand Promotion of Foreign Direct Investment In Developing Countries: Interests, Interdependencies, Intricacies, 31 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 686, 703
(1982).
277. See E.I. NWOGUGU, supra note 191, at 22-23.
278. See Voss, supra note 276, at 692. Expropriations by developing countries
occurred more frequently after the United Nations General Assembly's formal recognition of the sovereign right to expropriate alien properties in a nondiscriminatory
fashion. See id.; United Nations Resolution of Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural
Resources, G.A. Res. 1803, 17 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 17) at 15, U.N. Doc. A/5217
(1962); Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order,
G.A. Res. 3201, U.N. GAOR Supp. (6th Special Session) (No. 1) at 3, U.N. Doc.
A/9559 (1974); Charter of the Economic Rights and Duties of States, G.A. Res. 3281,
29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 50, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
G.A. Res. 3281].
279. Letter of Secretary of State Hull to Mexican Ambassador Castillo Najera,

reprinted in 5

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE

UNITED STATES DIPLOMATIC PAPERS: 1938 685, 687 (1956).

Secretary of State Hull

formulated this doctrine in his correspondence during the summer of 1938 with the
Mexican Ambassador while addressing the issue of the expropriation of United
States owned lands in Mexico. See id. at 685. He stated that the doctrine of equitable-treatment was well established and that "precedents and recognized authorities
on international law . . . [recognize that] no government is entitled to expropriate
private property....

without provision for prompt, adequate, and effective payment

therefor." See id. at 687.
The United States has continued to assert that there is an international standard
for the protection of the individual and the administration of justice. See P. JEssuP,
supra note 17, at 101. Latin American and other developing countries have countered this argument by insisting that aliens should be treated by the standard applied
to the nationals of the country in which they are doing business. See id. United Na-

tions General Assembly Resolution 3281, supra note 278, states that a nation expropriating an alien's property should provide appropriate compensation and that the
expropriating nation's law should apply in a controversy over the amount of compensation. G.A. Res. 3281, supra note 278, art. 2(c).
280. See W. BRANDT, NORTH-SOUTH: A PROGRAM FOR SURVIVAL 155-56 (1980)
(Report of the Independent Commission on International Development Issues).
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priation, because, by its very nature, it is more difficult to
prove when making a claim under an investment protection
agreement. 28 ' Governments commit covert expropriation by
limiting repatriation rights, 2 82 charging prohibitive taxes, forcing sales of majority interests in enterprises to locals, and enacting labor laws that restrict the number of foreigners. 8 3 Investment protection agreements and investment insurance
specifically tailored to deal with the varieties of covert expropriation are needed in order to increase private investor confidence in the ACP States.28 4
2.

A Comparison of Bilateral and Multilateral Investment
Protection Agreements

Lom6 III's success in increasing the flow of capital to ACP
States in the foim of direct investment depends on whether its
proposed investment protection agreements and insurance
plan will effectively promote investor confidence in ACP
States. 28 5 Lom' III provides for bilateral and multilateral investment protection agreements and for the study of a joint
281. See Voss, supra note 276, at 703. A poll by the German Federal Minister of
Economics Office showed that 500 German enterprises considered hidden expropriations as a more significant disincentive to investment than nationalization. See id.
282. Some of the ACP States are discussed in a Price Waterhouse publication on
investment regulation that lists specific government regulations that amount to covert expropriation. For example, the Ivory Coast's Financing Office requires a month
to approve repatriation rights. PRICE WATERHOUSE INVESTMENT REGULATION AROUND
THE WORLD 137 (1983) [hereinafter cited as P.W. GUIDE]. Liberia's National Bank
has additional charges on the outward transfer of funds. Id. at 162.
283. See E.I. NWOGUGU, supra note 191, at 11-21; Voss, supra note 276, at 702.
For example, Papua New Guinea requires investors in major resource projects to
offer the government the option of acquiring a stipulated percentage of the enterprise's equity. See P.W. GUIDE, supra note 282, at 230. Both Kenya andJamaica regulate foreign ownership in some fields and require licenses for operations. See id. at
141-43, 149-53.
Some ACP States limit the employment of non-residents. All recruitment in the
Ivory Coast has to be authorized by the OMOCI (employment office) which will authorize an employer to recruit directly only after it finds no available local candidate
for the job. See id. at 138. Fiji allows employers to hire foreigners but requires them
to train a native to replace the non-resident wherever possible. See id. at 80. Barbados will issue a work permit to a foreigner only when competent nationals are not
available. See id. at 18.
284. See Voss, supra note 276, at 705.
285. See id. The author states that the investor confidence gap would be narrowed if states established precise standards for investment protection and insurance. See id.
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ACP-EEC investment guarantee program. 8 6 The history of
the protection of investment in developing countries shows
that bilateral investment protection agreements have proved
more effective for providing investors with compensation for
their expropriated property.2 8 7 Lom&'s investment provisions
will promote investor confidence if the parties concentrate
their efforts on bilateral investment agreements and formulate
an ACP and EEC insurance plan that allows the ACP to share

responsibility for attracting investment.28 8
Article 243 proposes the conclusion of both bilateral and
multilateral private investment protection agreements. 2 "
Capital-exporting countries have found that bilateral agreements provide investor security more effectively than multilateral agreements, because specific terms can be negotiated between two parties more easily than when several parties negotiate. 290
Article 243(2) proposes that the ACP conclude
multilateral agreements with the Community and a Member
State for specific projects. 291 These multilateral agreements
cannot be as effective as the bilateral accords discussed in article 243(1),292 because their terms would have to be broadly
formulated to consider the interests of each Member State and
each ACP State. 29 3 These broader terms would be necessarily
286. Lom6 III, supra note 5, arts. 243, 244.
287. See Z. KRONFOL, supra note 202, at 30-36.
288. Cf id. at 35-37.
289. See Lom6 III, supra note 5, art. 243(l)-(2).
290. See Z. KRONFOL, supra note 202, at 30-36. The EEC would have to compromise more in the negotiations than a Member State because the ACP is more sensitive with regard to its members' sovereignty when dealing with the Community. See
Voss, supra note 191, at 382.
291. Lom6 III, supra note 5, art. 243(2).
292. Id. art. 243(1).
293. See Voss, supra note 191, at 382-83. The larger Member States have different investment protection interests than the smaller Member States, because the
larger Member States have greater bargaining power when negotiating bilateral accords with the ACP States than do the smaller Member States. SeeJ. RAVENHILL, supra
note 11, at 269-70. Member States will not be willing to strain the relationships that
they have established with the ACP States by means of their bilateral agreements in
order to carry out another Member State's entrepreneur's enterprise. See Voss, supra
note 191, at 383.
The ACP is a collection of countries with diverse economic interests. See Chasle,
Unity and Cohesion of the ACP Group, COURIER, Sept.-Oct. 1985, at 62. For this reason,
the Lom6 Conventions have specific protocols that accomodate individual ACP
States' interests. See id. at 63.
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vague and more difficult to enforce.2 9 4
Lom6 III's partners have not discussed an ACP-EEC investment insurance program. Among the issues raised by such
a plan is the source of its capital fund.2 9 5 Because the Member
States maintain their own national investment insurance
plans,2 9 6 most would probably be reluctant to divert funds
away from their programs to a Community program that would
not benefit their trade relations with the ACP States.
B.

The Negative Effect of the Rules of Origin and
the Safeguard Clause

Private investment in ACP States will remain sluggish even
if Lom6 III's private investment protection and promotion
provisions prove successful in improving' investor confidence
by reducing the risk of expropriation.2 9 7 This is partly because
the rules of origin and the safeguard clause discourage nonEEC operators from engaging in export enterprises in the ACP
States.2 9 8
1. The Rules of Origin
Because the rules of origin make non-EEC investors' exports to the Community less competitive than those of EEC
operators, non-EEC operators will invest in other developing
countries before they will make efforts to establish themselves
in ACP States. 2 99 Developing countries that are not part of the
294. See Voss, supra note 191, at 382.
295. See Z. KRONFOL, supra note 202, at 82-83. Most multilateral investment protection plans have been funded from premiums and capital contributions from participating nations. See id.
296. See OECD, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AND MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES,
NATIONAL TREATMENT FOR FOREIGN-CONTROLLED ENTERPRISES 2 (1985) [hereinafter
cited as OECD NATIONAL TREATMENT]; Voss, supra note 276, at 705 n.71. Almost all
OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) countries,
which includes all Member States of the EEC, have their own investment insurance
schemes. OECD NATIONAL TREATMENT, supra. Generally, national investment insur-

ance programs are based on a contract between a government agency and an investor. See Z. KRONFOL, supra note 202, at 37. The investor pays a premium. See id.
Some insurance programs will extend coverage only to investors in countries that
have signed investment protection agreements. See id.
297. See supra text accompanying notes 271-73 (discussion of the factors that
play a role in the investor's choice of a particular country for investment).
298. See supra text accompanying notes 152-63.
299. SeeJ. Moss, supra note 32, at 31.
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ACP now have the same preferential tariff access to the EEC,
but unlike the ACP, they need not comply with the rules of
origin.'0° Because of these advantages, non-EEC operators
are more likely to invest in those countries rather than in the
ACP States.
The rules of origin compromise the effectiveness of article
242(1)(a), which provides for exploring credit lines to finance
the importation of intermediate materials needed for ACP export industries.3 0 '

The rules of origin put pressure on the

ACP States to import their intermediate materials from the
EEC in order to preserve preferential access for their exports
to the Community.3 0 2 The rules thus discourage ACP States
from looking for the least expensive supplier of intermediate
materials and make ACP exports more expensive than products from other developing countries.30 3 The rules of origin
must be modified to limit them to their intended role of
preventing trade deflection. 0 4 They must not become a device that discourages non-Community investment in ACP
States.30

2. The Safeguard Clause
The safeguard clause, like the rules of origin, discourages
non-EEC investor activity in ACP States.30 6 The clause is a
threat to EEC and non-EEC investors, because it enables the
Community or a Member State to block ACP exports to the
EEC when the Community or that Member State suffers a serious disturbance in a sector of its economy or in its external
financial stability. 307 The clause as it is now worded would be
triggered by competition from ACP exports with goods pro300. The ACP States said that the 1986 Generalised System of Preferences
granted other developing countries' exports to the EEC the same treatment accorded
ACP exports to the Community. See Ambassadors Committee Touches On a Series of
Problems, EUROPEAN REPORT (No. 1179) § V, at 6-7 (Nov. 27, 1985) (bi-weekly newsletter published by the European Information Service).
301. See infra text accompanying notes 302-03; Lom6 II, supra note 5, art.

242(1)(a).
302. SeeJ. RAVENHILL, supra note 11, at 166-67.
303. See id. at 167, 175.
304. See id.; see supra note 123 (discussion of the operation of the rules of origin).
305. SeeJ. RAVENHILL, supra note 11, at 171.
306. See Yelpaala, supra note 28, at 850, 878-79.
307. Lomb III, supra note 5, art. 139(1).
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duced by weaker Community industries.30 8 Thus, an increased
flow of ACP exports stimulated by increased investment would

bring the clause into effect.3

9

The Community's promises not to use the safeguard
clause as a protectionist measure, and to use safeguard measures only to the extent necessary to remedy economic difficulties,3 1 0 do not offer EEC and non-EEC investors objective criteria for judging when the EEC will invoke the clause. Curiously, the Community pledged only not to invoke the clause
when it does not need to invoke the clause. The classification
of measures as either protectionist, or as vital to the stability of
an economic sector, is entirely subjective. A more objective
standard for invoking the safeguard clause is necessary in order to assure EEC and non-EEC operators that their products
will have access to the EEC.3 1'
IV.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPLEMENTING
ARTICLES 243 AND 244

Articles 240 to 247 are not self-executing investment provisions. Rather, the articles are a series of promises to study
methods for approaching the problems that discourage private
308. See McQueen, supra note 123, at 120 n.6. The clause has not been invoked
by the Community. However, the EEC has threatened to use the clause and as a
result restricted the flow of ACP cotton textiles to the Community. See id.
309. The safeguard clause may be invoked when Lom6 III's trade provisions
cause a serious disturbance in a sector of the economy of the Community or of one or
more of the Member States. Lom6 III, supra note 5, art. 139(1). Western Europe
experienced an economic slowdown and serious structural unemployment in the
1970's. See Vaitsos, supra note 8, at 178-79. ACP exports of manufactured goods
would be viewed as a threat to the EEC's recovering manufacturing sector. See id. at

181, 185-86. EEC Member States' governments will be under pressure from political
parties, businesses, management and unions to invoke the clause in order to preserve
jobs in traditional manufacturing industries. See TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS,
supra note 249, at 98-99. The EEC has spoken out against protectionism, stating that
protectionism is not in the best interest of the world economy. See COMMISSION OF

EEC AND
(COM X/1 16/84 Aug.
1984). The United Nations General Assembly has also moved to stop protectionist
meausres of developed countries by calling for an international program dealing with
the problems of protectionism that would allow the world economy to undergo structural adjustment. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Report of the Trade
and Development Board, U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 15) at 44, U.N. Doc. A/39/15 (1984).
310. Lom6 III, supra note 5, art. 139(1)(2).
311. See Note, supra note 11, at 478-79.
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES DIRECTORATE GENERAL FOR INFORMATION, THE

INDUSTRIAL COOPERATION WITH DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, 35
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investment in the ACP States.3" 2 However, these articles provide a framework for greater cooperation between the EEC
and the ACP in the field of investment protection and promotion. The responsibility for the ultimate success of articles 243
and 244 rests with the EEC and the ACP, who must agree on
appropriate action based upon the results of the planned studies. 31 3 The following are recommendations for the implementation of articles 243 and 244.
The bilateral investment protection agreements proposed
in subdivision one of article 243 will be more effective in promoting investment in ACP States than the multilateral agreements proposed in article 243(2).14 Bilateral agreements, by
their nature, allow the negotiation of precise terms that are
easier to enforce.31 5 Accordingly, the Community should drop
its pursuit of multilateral investment protection agreements
for special projects, and instead establish uniform minimum
standards for all Member States' investment agreements by
harmonizing the terms of its Member States' investment protection agreements.3 1 6
The implementation of a joint ACP and EEC investment
insurance program requires the resolution of questions concerning the form of its coverage and the source of its capital.
The limitation in article 244 seems to answer these questions.
Article 244 stipulates that an ACP and EEC insurance program
must complement the Member States' insurance programs.3" 7
This limitation would restrict ACP and EEC insurance to a
form of secondary coverage for the portion of the risk not
compensated for by Member States' insurance programs.
The future ACP and EEC joint insurance program needs a
capital fund. All the participants in the investment process
should contribute to this fund. Accordingly, investors should
312. See supra note 16.
313. See supra note 25 (discussion of the present state of the studies).
314. See supra text accompanying notes 292-94. For a list of some Member
States' bilateral investment protection agreements, see supra note 179.
315. Precise terms will make the investor's legal rights clear; thus, the terms will
bind the capital importing host country. See Voss, supra note 191, at 382.
316. The Community has discussed pursuing such a course of action. See Council Decision No. 69/494, supra note 240 (decision on the progressive standardization
of agreements concerning commercial relations between Member States and third
countries); see Voss, supra note 191, at 392.
317. Lom6 III, supra note 5.
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pay premiums based on the type of coverage required for their
enterprise.
Two factors must be considered when calculating the
Member States' contributions to the fund. First, each Member
State has its own investment insurance plan,3 1 8 and the joint
insurance will be limited to the portion of risk not covered by
the Member States' insurance plans.3" 9 The Member States'
contributions should reflect the amount of this uncovered risk.
Second, the contribution of each Member State should also reflect the volume of its trade with the ACP States.
The ACP States must participate in the capital formation
for the ACP and EEC joint insurance plan in order for the plan
to be effective. ACP participation would make the drive to attract investment to ACP States a partnership effort.
The ACP States' contributions should be based on the
same factors used to compute each Member States' contribution to the fund. However, the ACP States' contribution
should be a small percentage of the EEC's contribution, because of the parties' disparate levels of economic development.
In addition, each ACP State should be required to pay an annual premium based on its past performance under investment
protection agreements. Because an expropriating ACP State
would have to replenish the capital fund, it would be deterred
from expropriating foreign investments at the expense of the
other contributors to the insurance fund.
CONCLUSION
Lom6 III does not perpetuate the interdependence that
was a principal feature of the historical trade relationship between the EEC and the ACP. 3 20 Instead, articles 240 through
247 provide a framework in which Lom6's partners may formulate investment protection and promotion measures that will
enable the ACP States to attract private capital in order to
achieve their development goals. 3 21 The articles will have an
impact on the level of private investment if three conditions
318. Id.; see supra note 296 (discussion of the Member States' investment insurance programs).
319. See supra text accompanying note 317 (discussion of the limitation on the
ACP and EEC insurance program).
320. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
321. See supra text accompanying notes 312-13.
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are met. First, the parties must fulfill their obligations to complete the studies required by the Convention. Second, the
ACP and the EEC must agree on concrete measures based on
those studies. Finally, the rules of origin and the safeguard
clause must be modified to allow the investment protection
and promotion measures to increase investment in the ACP
States.
Theresa I. Yard

